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THE BORDERS OF SOLIDARITY:
HOW COUNTRIES DETERMINE THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE MIX IN
SPENDING AND THE IMPACT ON
HEALTH CARE
Colleen M. Floodt
Mark Stabilett
Carolyn Hughes Tuohytt
I. INTRODUCTION
THERE IS VIGOROUS DEBATE about the appropriate
roles of public and private finance in health care in many coun-
tries. How do different countries determine the mix of pub-
lic/private health care funding? What is the role of the courts in
determining who should receive publicly funded services and in
what time frame? What is the potential for a "Patients' Bill of
Rights" to address these kinds of issues? And what differences
do we find in terms of performance when we consider different
mixes of public/private funding?
In this paper we examine six countries: Canada, the United
States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and the
Netherlands. We have selected these countries because they are
of roughly similar wealth and, with the notable exception of the
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United States, aspire to have national health care systems. How-
ever, the structure and dynamics of each system is sufficiently
different that each of these countries can learn lessons from the
others about the impact of different mixes of public and private
financing. For each country we begin by looking at the proc-
esses by which the public/private mix in spending is determined
and the philosophical approach each country takes in deciding
what services to publicly fund and how to ration health care.
We look at court challenges by citizens in these countries who
are dissatisfied with rationing decisions and we also examine
the extent to which these different countries have sought to re-
spond to citizens' concerns through the establishment of Pa-
tients' Bills of Rights. We then turn to examine what evidence
there is on the impact of the public/private mix on health out-
comes, utilization, spending and waiting lists and times.
We have identified four basic models in term of the pub-
lic/private mix,' and the countries we are studying provide ex-
amples of these four models:
1. Parallel public and private systems: For a given range
of services, a separate privately financed system exists
as an alternative to the public sector. Britain, New Zea-
land, and Australia are examples of this type of "two-
tier" system where people, who either have the re-
sources or private insurance, can go to private hospitals
and jump queues for treatment in the public sector. The
services that are provided in the private sector are
primarily elective (non-emergency) care.
2. Co-payment: Health care services are partially subsi-
dized by the public sector, with the remainder financed
by out-of-pocket payments and/or private insurance.
The level of charges may be scaled according to the pa-
tient's income. In New Zealand there are significant
user charges for family doctor services-although
thirty-seven percent of the population have private in-
surance to help cover this cost, but many must pay out-
of-pocket. In Australia there are out-of-pocket payments
for a range of different services, albeit with a compli-
1 Carolyn H. Tuohy, Colleen M. Flood & Mark Stabile, How Does Private
Finance Affect Public Health Care Systems?: Marshalling the Evidence from OECD
Nations 1-2 (June 1, 2001) (working paper) (on file with Health Matrix).
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cated system of safety nets in place, so as not to deter
access by those on low incomes. In the United States,
the benefits provided under the Medicaid and Medicare
public programs, with some exceptions, require out-of-
pocket payments.
3. Group-based: Certain population groups, such as the
elderly and those on social assistance, are eligible for
public coverage; others rely on private insurance. The
United States and the Netherlands are examples of such
a system. However, the Netherlands differs from the
United States in an important respect: in the Netherlands
the majority of people are included in a mandatory so-
cial insurance plan, whereas in the United States most
people are ineligible for public insurance and either hold
private insurance or have no insurance.
4. Sectoral: Certain health care sectors are entirely pub-
licly financed; others are privately financed. The pri-
mary example of this is the Canadian system where al-
most 100% of hospital and physician services are pub-
licly funded, but where there is much more private fi-
nancing of drugs, experimental therapies, and home
care.
It is helpful to keep these models in mind as we proceed with
our discussion.
H. HOW DO COUNTRIES DETERMINE THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE MIX?
In this section we provide a detailed breakdown of the pub-
lic/private mix of financing in each country, explain each coun-
try's philosophical approach to allocating health care, and ex-
plain how it is decided what services will be publicly funded
and whether services are rationed explicitly or implicitly. As
predominantly public systems like Canada, New Zealand, Aus-
tralia, and the United Kingdom have engaged in explicit and
implicit rationing of health care, dissatisfied citizens are in-
creasingly turning to the courts. Thus, we examine court chal-
lenges launched against rationing decisions. Another measure
that we explore is the introduction of Patients' Bills of Rights,
particularly insofar as these initiatives speak to expanding pa-
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tients' entitlements to publicly funded health care services or to
ensuring timely treatment.
A. Canada
1. Public/Private Mix
The most recent spending figures break down total health
spending in Canada for the year 2000 as follows: Federal gov-
ernment direct spending - 3.8%; provincial governments -
65.2%;2 municipal governments - 0.8%; social security funds -
1.2%; 3 and private funds/insurance - 29%. 4 Looking more
closely at private spending, out-of-pocket payments by patients
account for approximately 17% of total health care spending.
The importance of private financing varies depending on the
particular health service or good under at issue; for example,
private financing of retail prescription drugs accounted for
58.6% of the total spent.
6
2. Philosophical Approach
Canada's primary principle in allocating health care ser-
vices is that care should be allocated on the basis of need and
not ability to pay.7 However, there are explicit limits to the
principle that care should be allocated on the basis of need, i.e.,
it only applies to certain kinds of goods and services. As de-
scribed in the introduction, the Canadian system falls within the
"sectoral" model in terms of the public/private mix, with certain
2 Provincial spending is subsidized by federal transfer payments but the
real extent of the subsidization is difficult to determine and is hotly contested.
3 In the Canadian context social security funds refer to Workers' Compen-
sation.
4 CANADIAN INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., HEALTH EXPENDITURES DATA 2000
(2001), available at http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw-page=spend-nhex
e.
5 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA
2000: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 29 COUNTRIES (2001) [hereinafter OECD
HEALTH DATA]. See the organization's web site at http://www.oecd.org/ for more
updated information.
6 CANADIAN INST. FOR HEALTH INFO., HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 2001, at
77 (2001), available at http://secure.cihi.ca/cihiweb/dispPage.jsp?cw-page=AR
43 E&cwtopic=43. The CIHI notes that in 1998 Canadians paid for 2% of
retail prescription drugs out-of-pocket and private insurers financed another
34.6%. Id.
7 NAT'L FORUM ON HEALTH, CANADA HEALTH ACTION: BUILDING ON THE
LEGACY - VOLUME I (1997), http://wwwnfh.hc-sc.gc.ca/publicat/finvoll/ idxvoll.htm.
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services being fully publicly funded and others being left much
more to a mix of private and public funding. The Canada Health
Act8 (CHA) primarily protects and ensures 100% public funding
for "medically necessary" hospital services and "medically re-
quired" physician services.9 The foundations of Canada's pub-
licly funded system' ° were laid down in the 1960s. Under-
standably, at this time, hospital and physician care was seen to
be of key importance as having to pay for the cost of this care
could be the source of financial catastrophe for patients. How-
ever, since then, advents in technology have caused a rise in the
importance of potentially very expensive drug therapy, gene
therapy, and home care; yet the CHA does not protect or ensure
public funding for these goods and services.
3. Processes for Determining What Is Publicly Funded
How does the Canadian system determine what services are
publicly funded? Most Canadians view the CHA as encapsulat-
ing their entitlements to publicly funded health care. The CHA
is a strong political symbol of Canadian values in health, but in
legal terms it is a spending statute setting out the conditions
upon which the federal government will make transfer payments
to the provinces.' The provinces, pursuant to the Constitution,
are responsible for operating their own respective health care
systems. Through the CHA the federal government seeks to
reconcile its desire to ensure national standards with its respect
for the fact that the courts have interpreted the Constitution in
such a way that health care is largely viewed as a provincial
matter. The CHA sets out five criteria that each provincial in-
surance plan must comply with in order to obtain federal fund-
8 R.S.C., ch. C-6, § 1 (1993).
9 Colleen M. Flood, The Structure and Dynamics of Canada's Health Care
System, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND PoLIcY 18-28 (Jocelyn Downie & Timothy
Caulfield eds., 2000).
1o This system is known as medicare-not to be confused with the U.S.
Medicare program for those over 65.
11 Flood, supra note 9, at 18; see also R. DFBER ET AL., NAT'L FORUM ON
HEALTH, SUMMARY OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE Mix IN HEALTH CARE (Feb. 1997),
available at http:I/wwwnfh. hc-sc.gc.ca/publicatlissuesum/deberl.htm (listing the five
federal conditions established in the CHA as universality, accessibility, comprehen-
siveness, portability and public administration); infra notes 10-12 and accompanying
text.
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ing: comprehensiveness, accessibility, universality,1 2 portabil-
ity 3, and public administration. 4 Although all the criteria of the
CHA are very important and interact together as values that
guide medicare, we discuss below the two principles that are
most relevant to determining what services will be publicly
funded: comprehensiveness and accessibility.
In terms of "accessibility," § 12 of the CHA provides that,
in order to qualify for federal funding, a province's plan must
provide "insured health services" on uniform terms and condi-
tions and in a way that ensures "reasonable access." However,
the most explicit sections of the Act speaking to accessibility
are those that expressly prohibit out-of-pocket payments and
extra-billing for medically necessary hospital and physician
services. A "user charge" occurs when a patient has to pay out
of her own pocket to cover some or all of the cost of care.
15
"Extra-billing" occurs where a doctor charges a patient addi-
tional amounts beyond that received from the government, re-
sulting in a patient paying for this difference out-of-pocket (a
user charge) or, if they have it, their private insurer covering the
difference. The CHA requires the federal government to claw-
back, on a dollar-for-dollar basis, from transfer payments those
sums that are paid for medically necessary hospital and physi-
cian services as user charges or extra-billing in a province. The
12 A provincial plan must entitle 100% of the insured persons of the province
to the "insured health services.. . on uniform terms and conditions." Canada Health
Act § 10. An "insured person" is defined, with some exclusions, as a "resident" of a
province. Id. § 2. A "resident" is further defined as "a person lawfully entitled to be
or to remain in Canada who makes his home and is ordinarily present in the province,
but does not include a tourist, a transient or a visitor to the province." Id.
13 A province's plan must insure all residents within 3 months of arrival in the
province and pay for the cost of insured health services provided to insured persons
while temporarily absent from the province at the rate approved by the insurance plan
of the province in which the services are provided or otherwise by agreement. Id. §
I1(1). Section 11(2), however, states that the criterion of portability is not contra-
vened if the administrator of a provincial plan requires a patient to obtain the admin-
istrator's consent before receiving non-emergency health services in another province
"if the services in question were available on a substantially similar basis in the prov-
ince." Id. § 11(2).
14 Despite the emphasis on "public" administration, there is nothing prevent-
ing a provincial ministry of health from contracting with a private corporation to
manage its health insurance plan. In 1997, the New Brunswick Ministry of Health
had entered into a contract (now terminated) with Blue Cross of Atlantic Canada to
build a new Medicare billing system and process Medicare billings for the province.
15 Patients may, if they do not hold private insurance to cover the user
charge, have to pay for the cost thereof out-of-pocket.
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CHA is very clear about what must happen in the event of the
existence of user charges or extra-billing and that financial bar-
riers should not constrain access. However, the CHA has noth-
ing explicit to say about constraining access where the system
does not have the capacity to meet a particular need or meet a
particular need in a timely fashion.
In terms of "comprehensiveness", § 9 requires provinces to
insure "all insured health services provided by hospitals, medi-
cal practitioners or dentists."' 6 Section 2 defines "insured health
services" as "hospital services, physician services and surgical-
dental services provided to insured persons"17 The substantive
content of "hospital services" coverage is set by a specific list
of in-patient services that are "medically necessary for the pur-
pose of maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or
treating an injury, illness or disability."18 "Physician services"
are defined as "any medically required services rendered by
medical practitioners."' 19 The CHA does not define the terms
"medically necessary" or "medically required." In practice this
leaves provinces with discretion as to which hospital and physi-
cian services will receive public funding. The services that are
publicly funded are negotiated between each provincial ministry
of health and each provincial medical association. The results of
these negotiations thus determine what services are "medically
necessary" or "medically required." In other words, the phrases
"medically required" and "medically necessary" are not used as
16 Canada Health Act § 9.
17 Id. § 2.
18 Id. Section 2 provides in full:
"hospital services" means any of the following services provided to in-
patients or out-patients at a hospital, if the services are medically necessary
for the purpose of maintaining health, preventing disease or diagnosing or
treating an injury, illness or disability, namely,
(a) accommodation and meals at the standard or public ward level
and preferred accommodation if medically required, (b) nursing ser-
vice, (c) laboratory, radiological and other diagnostic procedures,
together with the necessary interpretations, (d) drugs, biologicals
and related preparations when administered in the hospital, (e) use
of operating room, case room and anaesthetic facilities, including
necessary equipment and supplies, (f) medical and surgical equip-
ment and supplies, (g) use of radiotherapy facilities, (h) use of
physiotherapy facilities, and (i) services provided by persons who
receive remuneration therefor from the hospital,
but does not include services that are excluded by the regulations.
Id. § 2.
19 Id.
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a principled basis upon which to determine what should be pub-
licly funded, but are labels applied ex post to negotiations be-
tween the provincial ministries and provincial medical associa-
tions.
In recent years, Canadian provinces have begun explicit ra-
tioning of health resources by choosing to "delist" or "deinsure"
some health services, and announced that certain services will
no longer be publicly funded on the grounds that they are not
"medically necessary." 20 Although this process has been contro-
versial, the range of services delisted has been limited and has
had only a small impact on total health care spending. 21 Most of
the rationing that occurs is not explicit but implicit as the
vagueness of "medically necessary" and "medically required"
allows for implicit rationing to occur under conditions of re-
22source constraint. Although "medically necessary" hospital
and physician services may be insured, such that hip operations
are considered medically necessary, there are no national stan-
dards with regard to the time frame within which hip-operations
will be provided to those in need. The CHA does require that
provinces ensure "reasonable access" to services but this is a
difficult standard to measure, and thus, enforce. 23 Consequently
there is little in the CHA preventing the provinces from restrict-
ing the flow of resources into the public system so that physi-
cians must make increasingly harder choices between patients
and their various health needs. One can perhaps see that al-
though the entitlement to a comprehensive range of benefits is a
cornerstone principle of Canadian medicare, this principle is at
risk of erosion when provinces and/or providers operate under
increasing financial constraints.
It is important to note that the CHA protects and ensures a
national standard of full public funding for hospital and physi-
20 Michael M. Rachlis, Defining Basic Services and De-Insuring the Rest: The
Wrong Diagnosis and the Wrong Prescription, 152 CAN. MED. ASs'N J. 1401, 1401
(1995).
21 See CAROLYN HUGHES TUOHY, ACCIDENTAL LOGICS: THE DYNAMICS OF
CHANGE IN THE HEALTH CARE ARENA IN THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND CANADA
220 (1999) (noting that "[tiarget savings through delisting met or under consideration
by 1997 amounted to 2% or less of the respective provincial governments' expendi-
tures on physician services").
See generally Timothy A. Caulfield, Wishful Thinking: Defining "Medi-
cally Necessary" in Canada, 4 HEALTH L.J. 63 (1996) (discussing the difficulties in
defining "medically necessary").
23 Canada Health Act § 3.
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cian services, but this is not the case for prescription drugs out-
side of the hospital, home care, genetic tests, medical equip-
ment, etc. When a patient receives care in a hospital or from a
physician it is fully publicly funded. But if the patient receives
care in her own home, or from a non-physician provider, then
the patient may have to pay all or part of the cost thereof either
out-of-pocket or through her private insurer. As the locations of
care have shifted away from hospitals and into homes and
communities, the way that medicare is structured has opened the
way to passive privatization of the system. This means that care
is increasingly allocated on ability to pay and not need. It also
has regressive effects on the uptake of care that remains fully
publicly funded. For example, physician services are fully pub-
licly funded but prescribed medications resulting from a visit to
a physician are not. In Canada, individuals consumed, on aver-
age, 6.9 doctor's visits per year in 1995 and the average Cana-
dian received 8 prescriptions per year in 1995-more than one
prescription per visit.24 Stabile compared the use of doctors and
hospital services by individuals with private insurance and indi-
viduals with no insurance (public or private) and found that
those individuals with insurance use ten percent more doctors'
services than individuals without such coverage.2 Since access
to private drug insurance is highly correlated with income, the
impact of these differences on access to care is likely concen-
trated among the less well off.
Thus, in sum, the processes for determining what is pub-
licly funded are primarily implicit rather than explicit, and indi-
rect rather than direct. The CHA essentially ensures almost
100% public funding of most hospital and physician services.
However, it relies upon physicians to ration/allocate limited
public resources across different patients and medical needs.
Moreover, as the locations of care have shifted and drugs and
new technology have increased in importance, private financing
is accounting for an increased share of total spending in Canada
through a process of passive privatization.
24 HEALTH CANADA, DRUG COSTS IN CANADA 18-19 (1997), available at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hppb/healthcare/costs.htm.
25 Mark Stabile, Private Insurance Subsidies and Public Health Care Mar-
kets: Evidence from Canada, 34 CAN. J. ECON. 921 (2001).
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4. Court Challenges
As medicare undergoes difficult rationing exercises, and in
some areas falls short of public expectations of speed and qual-
ity, citizens are turning to the courts to challenge health policy
decisions both through administrative law and under the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the most
prominent cases are Eldridge v. British Columbia,26 Cameron v.
Nova Scotia27 and Auton v. British Columbia.28 In Eldridge, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the British Columbia gov-
ernment's failure to fund sign-language interpreters for the deaf
in hospitals as part of the public health insurance plan discrimi-
nated against deaf persons. This was because in the absence of
interpretation services, deaf individuals would not be able to
access publicly funded hospital and physician services, as other
Canadian citizens are able to (with communication being essen-
tial to the doctor/patient relationship.)2 9 In Cameron, the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal ruled that the Nova Scotia government's
decision not to fund a male infertility treatment discriminated
against infertile persons. However, the Court went on to find
such discrimination justified under § 15 (a reasonable limit pre-
scribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democ-
ratic society) largely because of the cost of treatment.30 In a
more recent case, Auton, there was a challenge to the British
Columbia government's decision not to fund a treatment for au-
tistic children. The plaintiffs were successful in their argument
before the British Columbia Supreme Court, claiming that as a
consequence of the government's failure there had been a
breach of their § 15 rights to equal protection and benefit of the
law.31
Another significant case is Chaoulli c. Quebec Procureur
general,32 which was a direct Charter challenge to Quebec's
prohibition on private health insurance for services that fall
within the public plan. This may prima facie seem an odd chal-
26 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
27 [1999] 177 D.L.R.4th 611.
28 [2000] 78 B.C.L.R.3d 55.
29 See Eldridge, at 690-91 (noting that "the provision of substandard medical
services to the deaf necessarily diminishes the overall quality of their lives").30 Cameron, 177 D.L.R.4th at 611.
3' Auton, 78 B.C.L.R.3d at 55.32 C.A. Que. Montreal 500-09-009693-003 (Cour d'appel du Quebec 2000).
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lenge, but some people want private insurance even though ser-
vices are publicly insured so they can avoid queues in the public
system. Finding as a fact that the health care system in the prov-
ince of Quebec suffered serious gaps and deficiencies, the pro-
hibitions under attack were found to violate liberty and security
of the person. However, after balancing the individual right to
choose and access necessary health services against the collec-
tive goal of ensuring equal access to all, the Court found these
violations to be in accordance with fundamental justice, and
thus not in violation of § 7 of the Charter.3
Although litigants have historically not been successful in
using the Charter to extend the range of goods and services that
must be publicly funded, or even in challenging prohibitions on
private insurance for services that should be provided in the
public system, this may be changing. In Eldridge the hearing-
impaired plaintiffs were successful but it was clear that they
were not asking for any new health care good or service but the
means (interpretation services) to utilize health care services
that similarly situated patients without a hearing impairment
would have been entitled to. However, this means of limiting
the precedent of Eldridge in opening up claims for public fund-
ing of new health care services was roundly rejected in the
Auton case where the plaintiffs were successful in their Charter
challenge to the British Columbia government's failure to fund
treatments for autistic children.34 Nonetheless, although there
are hints that plaintiffs may become more successful in Charter
claims, this is obviously an unsatisfactory way to deal with
most grievances or concerns that citizens may have due to the
expense and delay inherent in Charter litigation.
In two provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, there are
administrative tribunals in place to deal with claims that the re-
spective provincial governments should be publicly funding
particular treatments. In Ontario, a high profile case involved
that of Fiona Webster, who successfully argued before the
Health Services Appeal and Review Board that the provincial
government should fund the BRCA1 genetic test she required to
determine whether she had a predisposition to breast cancer.
33 Id.
34 Auton, 78 B.C.L.R.3d at 55.
35 See C. Abraham, Tenacious Woman Scores Medical Victory: Fiona Web-
ster's Fight Opens Access to Genetic-Breast Cancer Test, GLOBE & MAIL (To-
ronto), Aug. 27, 1999, at Al.
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These kinds of administrative mechanisms provide an outlet for
patients' concerns about the breadth of publicly funded schemes
and arguably are a much more efficient and fair mechanism for
resolution of these kinds of disputes than expensive and pro-
tracted Charter litigation.
A key concern of Canadians is increasing waiting lists and
times. 36 However, none of the Charter cases or the administra-
tive regimes speak to a right to access health care in a timely
fashion. The only successful claim before the courts with regard
to waiting times has been Stein v. Quebec.37 In this case Mr.
Stein waited months for surgery, even though his doctors
warned his life was in danger if he was not operated on within
four to eight weeks. He was successful before the Quebec Supe-
rior Court in overturning the Quebec health insurance board of-
ficials' refusal to pay for his treatment in a New York hospital
on the grounds that, given the facts of the case, the decision was
patently unreasonable.3 8 This was the first successful case to
argue for payment for a procedure that was available in Canada,
but because of waiting lists, meant that it could not be done
quickly enough.
5. Patients' Bill of Rights
In Canada, some hospitals and other institutions have their
own internal codes of rights for patients and, in some occasions,
have appointed individuals who mediate between patients and
the institution and providers to resolve complaints and con-
cerns. In May 2001, the Quebec government introduced Bill 27
providing for the establishment of a Health and Social Services
Ombudsman. 39 Apart from Quebec, Patients' Bills of Rights are
36 See Shelley Martin, Almost 1 in 2 Canadians Says Health System Needs
Major Surgery 165 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 465 (2001) (indicating twenty-two percent of
Canadians feel that longer waiting times have contributed to the system's decline).
37 No. C.S. Que. Montreal 500-05-045298-989 (Cour superieure du Quebec
Aug. 5, 1999).
38 Id.
39 An Act Respecting the Health and Social Services Ombudsman and
Amending Various Legislative Provisions, 36th National Assembly, 2d Sess., ch. 43,
(2001), available at http:llwww.assnat.qc.ca/eng/PublicationslProjets-loilPublics/ind
ex.htm. The Bill provides that, except in certain specific cases, the Ombudsman will
only examine a complaint after it has been heard at first instance by an institution, a
regional board or the Corporation d'urgences-sant6 de Montr6al Mdtropolitain. Id. at
ch.3, div.I. The Ombudsman may hold an inquiry as part of the examination of a
complaint. Id. Following an examination Bill 27 provides that the Ombudsman must
[Vol. 12:297
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also under consideration in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Mani-
toba.4° The flurry of activity in various provinces within Canada
reflects a desire on the part of provincial government to respond
in a tangible way to mounting public concern about the quality,
timeliness, and accessibility to medicare. Whether a Patients'
Bill of Rights will quell these concerns or actually improve the
quality, timeliness or accessibility of medicare is unclear given
the experiences of other jurisdictions with similar legislative
initiatives, as discussed further below.
B. Australia
1. Public/Private Mix
Australia's public/private split on health care mirrors that
of Canada's with 69.3% of total health care spending coming
from public sources and 30.7% coming from private sources.4'
However, unlike Canada, there is much more direct spending
from the federal level, with the Commonwealth government
paying for approximately 45% of total health care spending.42
Australian state and local governments account for 23.4% of
total health care spending.43 Approximately 16.2% of total
health care spending comes from out-of-pocket payments by
communicate his or her conclusions, including reason, to the complainant, together
with any appropriate recommendations addressed to the institution or regional board
or the highest authority of the entity whose services are the subject of complaint. Id.
In the event that the entity in question does not satisfactorily respond to the Om-
budsman's recommendations, he or she may advise the Minister, and may make it the
subject of a special report to the Minister. Id.
40 See Honourable Hilary M. Weston, Lieutenant Governor of the Province of
Ontario, Speech from the Throne on the Opening of the First Session of the Thirty-
Seventh Parliament of the Province of Ontario (Oct. 21, 1999), http://www.premier.
gov.on.ca/english/library/thronespeech-Oct2199.htm (stating that "[y]our government
will introduce a Patient's Bill of Rights that protects patients' rights to access health
services, to complete information about their health, and to respect for their privacy,
personal dignity and safety"). In Saskatchewan, the Patients' Rights Association
submitted a draft Bill of Rights to the Premier in September 2000, but legislation has
yet to be introduced into the House. Also, in April 2000 a private member's bill was
introduced to create an office of a Health System Ombudsman for Saskatchewan. We
also understand there have been calls for such legislation in Manitoba.
41 OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
42 AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AUSTRALUA'S HEALTH
2000, at 233, available at http://www.aihw.gov.aulpublicationslhealthlahOOlindex.
html.
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patients.44 In particular, out-of-pocket payments by patients ac-
count for a large proportion of spending on dental care (62.2%)
and pharmaceuticals (46.2%).4T The Commonwealth govern-
ment administers a pharmaceutical benefits plan that provides
universal access, albeit with significant out-of-pocket payments
for users. Private insurance accounts for a very small proportion
of spending on pharmaceuticals but does account for 13% of
spending on hospital and other institutional services and 7.4%
of spending on non-institutional services.46
2. Philosophical Approach
There is tension within Australia's philosophical approach
to the allocation of care. As in most developed countries the
guiding principle is that care should be allocated on the basis of
need and not ability to pay. However, the Australian system is
also guided by a historical commitment (the origins of which
are unclear) to encourage tripartite funding from the govern-
ment, private insurance and from out-of-pocket payments. The
latter two sources of financing are usually viewed as regressive.
Then, in order to reconcile the desire to encourage tripartite
funding of the system with the goal of redistribution, Australia
has a complicated system of safety nets and exceptions to its
requirements for out-of-pocket payments. There is also a com-
plicated system of direct and indirect public subsidies to the
private insurance sector to ensure its sustainability.
3. Processes for Determining What Is Publicly Funded
The relevant legislation provides that Australians are enti-
tled to a benefit of either 75% or 85% (depending on the ser-
vice) of a centrally set schedule of fees for physician services.47
There is an upper limit on the amount a patient must pay for a
service and the legislation provides that the government pay for
the entire service less the "greatest permissible gap," (A$50.40)
44 See OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5
45 See AusT. INST. OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AUSTRALIA'S HEALTH
2000, at tbl.S41 (2000), available at http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/
health/ah00/
46 See id.
47 See AUSTL. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND AGING, THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM: AN OUTLINE 7-8 (2000), available at http://www.health.gov.au/
haf/ozhealth/ozhealth.pdf.
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which can be borne by the patient.48 Concessional patients4 9 are
not required to pay anything for physician services.
The Commonwealth government in Australia is more di-
rectly involved in administrating the health system than, for ex-
ample, Canada's federal government, and it largely finances and
administers physician services. However, the process of decid-
ing what services will be publicly funded is similar to what oc-
curs at the provincial level in Canada. In Australia, the Minister
of Health sets the fee schedule after receiving non-binding ad-
vice from a Medicare Benefits Advisory Committee (MBAC),
which is composed mainly of medical practitioners, and after
"detailed discussion with the Australian Medical Association
(AMA)." 50 Thus as in Canada, what services are publicly funded
is largely a matter of negotiation between the Ministry of Health
and physician bargaining associations.
With regard to hospital services, as in Canada, the Com-
monwealth (or federal government) requires states to abide by
certain principles in return for funding for hospital services.
There are no user fees for treatment at public hospitals so long
as the patient accepts an assigned physician.
Unlike Canada, the Australian Commonwealth government
administers and finances a national drug plan. With regard to
drug coverage, general patients are required to pay up to
A$20.60 per prescription item up to an annual cap of A$612
after which they are required to only pay A$3.30 per prescrip-
tion item. Concessional patients are required to pay A$3.20 per
prescription item up to annual cap of A$166.40, beyond which
prescriptions are free. The Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory
Committee advises the Minister of Health what drugs to include
in the national formulary.
48 See AusTL. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND AGING, AUSTRALIA: SELECTED
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND FINANCING STATISTICS tbl.6 (Sept. 2000), available
at http://www.health.gov.au/haf/ozhealth/tablesupp.pdf.
49 These are people who receive certain pensions, benefits or cards admin-
istered by the Departments of Family and Children's Services or Veterans' Af-
fairs, or who meet certain criteria for being declared to be disadvantaged.
50 ANDREW PODGER & PHILIP HAGAN, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND AGED CARE
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES No. 1, REFORMING THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CARE SYS-
"M: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 15 (Mar. 1999), available at http://www.health
.gov.au/pubs/hfsocc/ocpanewl.pdf.
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4. Court Challenges
We have not been able to identify any cases in Australia
where patients have challenged explicit or implicit limits on the
publicly funded system. However, in a recent and high profile
case, Pfizer Pty Ltd v. Birkett.5' a major drug company brought
an action challenging the decision of the Pharmaceutical Bene-
fits Advisory Committee (PBAC) to recommend against inclu-
sion of Viagra on the list of publicly subsidized drugs. The
PBAC had recommended against including Viagra on the basis
of medical and cost-effectiveness factors. The Full Federal
Court of Australia rejected Pfizer's contention that PBAC was
wrong in taking into account the likely overall cost of subsiding
Viagra under the scheme. However, the Federal Court did find
that PBAC should have notified or allowed Pfizer the opportu-
nity to comment on the information it had concerning the fact
that "another drug for the same condition was used at a consid-
erably higher rate than originally predicted. 52 This information
contributed to PBAC's conclusion that "Viagra would be used
at a greater rate than that estimated by Pfizer and hence cost the
Commonwealth more than the figures submitted by Pfizer."53
Thus PBAC's initial decision was overturned and it has been
asked to reconsider its decision after giving this information to
Pfizer and receiving submissions thereon.
5. Patients' Bill of Rights
Each state in Australia is required to establish a "Public Pa-
tient's Hospital Charter" (PPHC) and a complaints body. The
Tasmanian PPHC rights are typical of the kinds of rights that
are protected. This Charter provides for a right to give an in-
formed consent-to "[r]eceive a clear and concise explanation
of the operation or procedure you are about to undergo"-and
the right to confidentiality-"to expect that details of your con-
dition and treatment are kept confidential, except where the law
requires otherwise." 54 As can be seen, the PPHCs tend to list
rights that already exist in the common law or are already re-
51 (2001) FCA 828, available at http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/udg
mts_video0l.html.
52 id.
53 Id.
4 NORTH WEST REGIONAL HOSPITAL, TASMANIA, at http://www.nwrh.
dhhs.tas.gov.au/patientinformation/ (last modified Nov. 19, 2001).
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quired of health care professionals through their own ethical
codes and self-regulating colleges. These Charters of Rights do
not speak to patients' entitlements to access publicly funded
care or to timeliness.
To ensure the safety of private patients, Australia's Com-
monwealth government created a Private Health Insurance Om-
budsperson in 1995. The Ombudsperson can deal with com-
plaints, investigate, make recommendations to the Minister of
Health, and publish information about complaints against pri-
vate insurers. Australia expressly endorses a policy of encour-
aging private insurance and this may explain why it has estab-
lished an ombudsperson to protect private patients. By contrast,
Canada, where private insurance is growing as a result of pas-
sive privatization and not explicit government policy, does not
have similar legislation.
C. Netherlands
1. Public/Private Mix
The mix of funding for health care in the Netherlands,
based on 1998 figures, is as follows: Exceptional Medical Ex-
penses Scheme - 36%; Sickness Fund Scheme - 35%; private
health insurance - 15%; governmental -5%; and other sources
(including patient co-payments) - 9%.55 The mandatory Excep-
tional Medical Expenses and Sickness Fund schemes, described
below, are social insurance schemes funded through employer
and employee contributions. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) records the percentage
of public spending of total health care spending at 70.4% for
1998.56 However, this figure may lead to confusion about the
true extent of the Dutch government's role in financing care as
the figure of 70.4% includes within it the mandatory social in-
surance schemes, which are financed by employer and em-
ployee contributions and not through general taxation revenues.
The government has only a very minor role in directly financing
55 PIETER HUIJBERS & ALISON MAR'nN, NETHERLANDs INSTITUTE OF GERON-
TOLOGY, ELDERLY CARE IN THE NETHERLANDS: HEALTH CARE INSURANCE IN THE
NETHERLANDS, http://www.kenniscentrum-ouderen.nl/newlkco/facts/facts-healthcare
insurance.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).56 OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
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the system (five percent of total health care spending). 57 Indi-
rectly the government does have a significant role in the system
by requiring certain groups to buy insurance and by regulating
social and private insurers. Compared to other countries, only a
relatively small component of health care-seven percent-is
financed by out-of-pocket payments. 58 Thus, the Dutch system
is not publicly funded but it is nonetheless progressively
funded, as most contributions are set as a percentage of an em-
ployee's salary and the role of out-of-pocket payments is small.
2. Philosophical Approach
Dutch scholars often describe the philosophical approach of
the Netherlands towards the allocation of health care as one of
"solidarity." The word "solidarity" encapsulates a strong com-
mitment on the part of Dutch citizens to ensuring access to
health care on the basis of need and not ability to pay. This
prima facie seems surprising given reliance in the Netherlands
upon private insurers, which are generally viewed as a regres-
sive means of financing health care. However, the Dutch regu-
late private insurers to ensure the goal of solidarity, and so, al-
though committed to progressive funding, are not committed to
public funding for its own sake. Also, it is very important to
note that having private insurance in the Netherlands does not
allow people to jump queues. It is seen as against a physician's
ethical code to prefer a patient with private insurance to a pa-
tient without. Moreover, unlike the United Kingdom and New
Zealand, there are not separate private hospitals, and in the
Netherlands, social insurance and private patients are treated
side-by-side in the same hospitals. 9
57 Id.
58 MINISTERIE VAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID, WELZJN EN SPORT, HEALTH INsuR-
ANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 7 (Jan. 2000). The 1998 figure from the OECD 2000 is
5.9%. OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
59 See W.B.F. Brouwer & F.T. Schut, Priority Care for Employees: A Bless-
ing in Disguise?, 8 HEALTH ECON. 65 (1999) (stating that the Netherlands' uniform
treatment of all is based on the principle of equity in health care); see also generally
Werner B.F. Brouwer & Herbert E.G.M. Hermans, Private Clinics for Employees as
a Dutch Solution for Waiting Lists: Economic and Legal Arguments, 47 HEALTH
PoL'y 1 (1999) (concluding that priority treatment of one person over another is justi-
fiable if both the intended purpose is justified and if such treatment is a means to
achieve this intended purpose).
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3. Processes for Determining What is Publicly Funded
Despite its apparent reliance on private insurance, nearly
100% of the population of the Netherlands has health insurance
coverage and the range of services covered is generous. There
are three important government-mandated insurance schemes,
largely funded by employer and employee contributions:
1. The "Exceptional" or "Catastrophic" medical ex-
penses scheme is mandatory and covers the entire popu-
lation for long-term care and mental health care.
2. The Sickness Fund scheme is mandatory for about
64% of the population earning less than 64,600 Guild-
ers60 and covers the cost of hospital and physician ser-
vices, drugs, and home care.
3. Finally, the Civil servant scheme is mandatory for all
civil servants (approximately six percent of the popula-
tion) and covers all medicines and related products and
hospital treatment, and pays 80 to 90% of other health
care costs.
61
In addition to these three government-mandated schemes,
the government also regulates private insurers. This is to pre-
vent them from risk rating premiums in order to avoid the result
of unaffordable premiums or to prevent them from offering no
coverage at all for high-risk individuals. 62 The benefit package
offered by private insurers in the Netherlands is similar to that
offered by the non-profit Sickness Funds.63
How do the Dutch determine what services will be covered
by the compulsory social insurance plans? As in Australia and
Canada, this has largely been left to a process of contractual
negotiations between payers (social and private insurers) and
60 One guilder is worth approximately 0.65 Canadian dollar or 0.42 U.S.
dollars.
61 MINISTERM VAN VOLKSGEZONDHEID, WELZJN EN SPORT, supra note 58, at
56. 62 See id. at 51 (describing the apportionment contribution).
63 See R.L.J.M. Scheerder, The Financing of the Dutch Health Care System,
in HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN THE NETHERLANDS 163, 165 (AJ.P. Schrijvers &
Liliane Droyan Kodner eds., 1997).
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physician bargaining associations. 64 However, the Dutch have
also attempted to develop a filtering mechanism to aid the de-
termination of what services should be included in the manda-
tory social insurance schemes. In 1992, the Government Com-
mittee on Choices in Health Care 65 argued for a more careful
evaluation of what would and would not be included in the ba-
sic package of services covered by the proposed compulsory
basic insurance plan for all citizens.66 The Dunning Committee
proposed that four criteria be used to sift out those services that
should not be included in the basic package of care. These crite-
ria were as follows: first, that the community in general consid-
ers the care to be necessary; second, that the services are effec-
tive; third, that the services are efficient using cost-
effectiveness analyses or cost-utility analyses; and, finally, that
it is not appropriate for patients themselves to pay for the health
services in question. It was proposed that care not meeting the
four requirements be left to the unregulated private sector.67 Po-
litical pressures have frustrated attempts to systematically im-
plement rationing using the Dunning criteria. 68 However, as dis-
cussed below, the courts have sometimes turned to the Dunning
criteria to justify rationing practices.
4. Court Challenges
Apart from explicit rationing by excluding certain services
from the mandatory social insurance schemes, implicit rationing
can occur through limitations on the budgets of institutions and
health care providers, who are then required to make hard
choices between different patients' health care needs. Dutch
64 See Bradford L. Kirkman-Liff, Cost Containment and Physician Payment
Methods in the Netherlands, 26 INQUIRY 468 (1989) (describing the Netherlands'
negotiating agreements structure as a solution for cost containment which could be
adopted by Medicare and Medicaid in the U.S.).
65 This is known as the Dunning Committee, after its Chairman.
66 GOV'T COMM. ON CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE, NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF
WELFARE, HEALTH AND CuLTuRAl AFFAIRS, CHOICES IN HEALTH CARE 29-33 (1992)
(observing that care and social services that are made available to all people "must be
necessary, effective and appropriate, and it must not be able to be left to the responsi-
bility of the individual patient").
67 Frederik T. Schut & Herbert E.G.M. Hermans, Managed Competition Re-
form in the Netherlands and Its Lessons for Canada, 20 DALHOUSIE L.J. 437, 456
(1997).
68 See Herbert Hermans & Andre den Exter, Priorities and Priority-Setting in
Health Care in the Netherlands 39 CROATIAN MED. J. 346 (1998) (discussing
reforms to the Dutch health care system).
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courts have shown some sympathy for patients who are denied
care because of excessively budget-conscious institutions.
However, they have been reluctant to nullify contractual budget
targets, especially where they are viewed as reasonable, or re-
quire treatment where an insurer does not have a contract with
the institution in question.69 According to Dutch scholars Her-
mans and den Exter, Dutch courts "attach much importance to
the Dunning criteria-in particular the necessity criterion. 7 °
For example, the courts have decided that citizens are not enti-
tled to coverage for services simply because they are available
and appropriate.71 Countries like Australia and Canada may
wish to consider the benefits of having a principled mechanism,
like the Dunning criteria, to determine what services should be
publicly funded. Although there may be political impediments
to systematically implementing a principled scheme of rationing
nation-wide, such a framework should assist in negotiations be-
tween ministries of health and medical associations and also
assist courts in their decisions regarding patient entitlements.
Increasingly, citizens in the European Union are bringing
challenges to limitations imposed by national social insurance
plans on the ability of patients to be reimbursed for treatment
received in a member state of which they are not a resident.72
Will this result in patients being able to argue for compensation
for care that is not covered or available in the country where
they reside, or for which there are long waiting lists in the coun-
try in which they reside, but which is available in another mem-
ber state? In B.S.M Geraets-Smits v. Stichting Ziekenfonds
69 See id. at 353 (discussing the courts' reactions to patients' claims for health
care benefits).
70 ld.
71 Id.
72 The judgments in Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employes Prives,
[1998] E.C.R. 1-1831, reprinted in [1998] 2. C.M.L.R. 879) and Kohll v. Union des
Caisses de Maladie, [1998] E.C.R. 1-1931, reprinted in [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 928, set a
precedent requiring member states to reimburse their residents up to the tariffs set by
their respective social insurance plans for goods and services purchased in other
member states. Thus, for example, in Decker, a resident of Luxembourg was success-
ful in having the Luxembourg plan reimburse him up to its own flat fee tariff for
spectacles and corrective lenses purchased in Germany despite the fact that he did not
obtain prior authorization as required by domestic legislation. Similarly, Kohll held
that the treatment of a Luxembourg national's daughter by an orthodontist in another
member state outside a hospital infrastructure and for remuneration was a service
within the meaning of Article 60 E.C.
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VGZ,73 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found that the pro-
visions of an EC Treaty do not preclude a Member State, like
the Netherlands, from having legislation enabling a sickness
insurance fund to require prior authorization before paying for
the cost of care provided in a hospital in another Member State.
Before authorization is given, a sickness insurance fund is enti-
tled to require that "the treatment must be regarded as normal in
the professional circles concerned" and "the insured person's
medical treatment must require that treatment." 74 The ECJ found
that the imposition of these kinds of conditions was in principle
acceptable. However, in order to comply with the EC Treaty,
the condition that the treatment be regarded as normal must be
construed so that authorization cannot be refused on the grounds
that it is not general practice in the Netherlands if it is nonethe-
less sufficiently tried and tested by international medical sci-
ence. 76 Also, the ECJ stated that the authorization can only be
refused on the ground of medical necessity if the same or
equally effective treatment can be obtained without undue delay
at a hospital or other institution with which the insured's sick-
ness insurance fund has a contract. 77
It should be noted that although the ECJ took seriously the
need to maintain the financial integrity of sickness insurance
schemes and to ensure continuity in planning the delivery of
hospital services, the judgment has been interpreted by some
commentators as meaning that patients were entitled to seek
treatment abroad, unless it could be provided domestically
without 'undue delay.' 78 However, this misinterprets the ECJ
judgment. It was an interpretation by courts in the Netherlands
of their own domestic legislation that resulted in the notion that
in deciding whether a patient needed the medical treatment (and
thus could be obtained in another jurisdiction) one must con-
sider whether the treatment was available without undue delay
in the Netherlands. It is not at all certain that the ECJ could re-
quire a Member State with long waiting lists to reimburse pa-
7' 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1147 (E.C.J.).
74 Id. at *50. This latter condition had been interpreted by the national court in
the Netherlands as requiring consideration of the methods of treatment available there
and whether adequate treatment can be available without undue delay, in the Nether-
lands.
75 B.S.M Geraets-Smits, 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 1147 at *33-*37.
76 Id. at *14.
7nId. at *51.
78 Medicine sans Frontires, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2001, at 48, 49.
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tients for care obtained in other Member States if there is not in
place domestic legislation that provides, or is interpreted to
provide, that treatment should be available without undue delay.
5. Patients' Bill of Rights
The Netherlands has a complex web of patient complaint
and appeal procedures designed to bring accountability to the
decisions of all social and private insurers. The appeal route de-
pends on the nature of the complaint as well as the insurer in
question.79 Patients' first recourse for complaints about entitle-
ments to coverage or quality of care under the mandatory social
plans, the Exceptional Medical Expenses, the Sickness Fund,
and the Civil Servants plans, is to the Board of the relevant so-
cial insurer.80 In certain cases, the insurer's Board is required to
consult with an external Health Care Insurance Board in arriv-
ing at its decision on the complaint. 81 Patients receiving an ad-
verse decision from their insurer may then appeal to administra-
tive agencies set up by the government to review insurers' deci-
sions. This may mean an appeal to the Central Appeals Tribunal
(in the case of Sickness Fund appeals), and in some cases to the
National Ombudsman.82 Under the private insurance plans, the
main recourse for complaints is the civil courts.83 It is instruc-
tive to compare the complaint and appeal procedures provided
for in the Netherlands, particularly vis-h-vis insurers or pur-
chasers of care with the relative lack of mechanisms to ensure
accountability on the part of administrators of public insurance
plans in countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand.
D. United States
1. Public/Private Mix
Government programs in the United States, federal and
state combined, comprised 43.6% of total health care spending
79 Telephone Interview with Andre den Exter, Erasmus University, Rot-
terdam (March 5, 2001). We are grateful to Mr. den Exter, for explaining to us
the various appeal routes and mechanisms in the Netherlands.
so Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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in 1998.84 Private health insurance comprised 33.1%, out of
pocket payments comprised 19.6%, and other private funds
made up 3.7%.85 As of 1999 about 73% of people under age
sixty-five had some form of private health insurance, with ap-
proximately 92% of private coverage provided through em-
ployment relationships.86
There are two significant public programs, Medicare and
Medicaid. Medicare is a federally funded health insurance plan
available to persons over age sixty-five, some of the disabled,
and those suffering from permanent kidney failure. All benefits
attract a mix of co-payments, co-insurance, or deductibles.87
Medicaid is a federal/state entitlement program that pays for
medical assistance for some of the poor. 88 To be eligible for
federal funds, States are required to provide Medicaid coverage
for individuals who receive federally assisted income mainte-
nance programs. The amount of federal funding for Medicaid
has no set limit; rather, the federal government matches what
individual States provide. 89 The scope of coverage under the
Medicaid plan varies considerably from state to state.
The private share of spending depends on the nature of the
health service in question. Prescription drugs, for instance, re-
main primarily privately financed, although the public share has
been gradually increasing. In 1998, public spending accounted
for only 15.4% of spending on drugs, and although up from the
1990 figure of 10.9%, this is still well below the OECD average
of 57.6% of public funding for drugs, based on 1997 figures.90
By comparison, public spending on inpatient institutional medi-
84 CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION & NAT'L CTR. FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2000, at 327 tbl.119 (2000) [hereinafter HEALTH, UNITED
STATES], available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/huslhusOO.pdf.85 id.
86 See id. at 339 tbl.128.
87 Co-payments are out-of-pocket payments levied on patients per use (e.g., a
$10 fee). Deductibles and co-insurance refer to amounts the user must pay privately
to share the cost of the service with Medicare. Deductibles are one-time charges,
whereas co-insurance charges are sometimes made in addition to deductibles on a
periodic basis to shift ongoing costs to the patient.
88 The cut-off level being determined on a state by state basis.
89 HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICAID SERVICES, at www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/mservice.htm (last visited Jan. 17,
2002). The U.S. Health Care Financing Administration is now called the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services.
90 OECD HEALTH DATA supra note 5.
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cal services is much higher, accounting for 60.8% of total inpa-
tient spending in 1998, up from almost 54% in 1990.91 Thus one
can see here that, whereas in countries like Canada the share of
private financing has been increasing incrementally, in the
United States the share of public financing has been increasing
incrementally.
2. Philosophical Approach
The overarching philosophy in the United States with re-
spect to allocating health care is best described as a commit-
ment to providing safety nets. This is in contrast to nearly every
other developed country in the world where all persons, regard-
less of status, are entitled to at least some public subsidy for a
range of medically necessary hospital and physician services. In
the United States, entitlements to public funding of a minimally
necessary set of health services are confined to specific disad-
vantaged or groups that are deemed morally worthy: those over
65, the elderly, the terminally ill, and some of the disabled.
People who do not belong to these groups must rely on private
insurance or their own financial resources to pay for health care.
Consequently, the United States leaves a significant proportion
of its population (16.3%) without the security of health insur-
ance.
92
3. Processes for Determining What Is Publicly Funded
While both Parts A and B of Medicare offer a wide range
of benefits, albeit subject to various forms of coinsurance, de-
ductibles and out-of-pocket payments, some services are not
covered by Medicare at all. These include drugs outside of insti-
tutions, dental care, cosmetic surgery, custodial care in the
home or nursing home, routine physical examinations, routine
eye care, some vaccinations, and some preventive screening
tests.
Medicaid, the public insurance program for the poor, allows
each State to set its own eligibility standards, determine the
type, amount, duration, and scope of services, set the rate of
payment for services, and administer its own program. Medicaid
policies for eligibility, services, and payment are complex and
vary considerably, even among states of similar size or geo-
91 Id.
92 HEALTH, UNITD STATES, supra note 84, at 365 tNl.146.
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graphic proximity. However, a State's Medicaid program must
offer medical assistance for certain basic services to the most
categorically needy populations.93 States may also, with certain
exceptions, impose nominal deductibles, coinsurance, or co-
payments on Medicaid. 4
The State of Oregon received dispensation from the federal
requirement to cover certain basic services for its Medicaid
program as part of an experiment, designed to increase the
number of people covered, by rationing the range of services to
be publicly funded. Oregon's unique reforms to its State Medi-
caid program have attracted attention because of its explicit
public process for determining the scope of Medicaid entitle-
ments.95 The Oregon Basic Health Services Act,96 passed in
1989, was designed to extend coverage of the Medicaid package
in Oregon to include all those at or below the poverty line, pri-
marily by means of explicitly rationing the services provided.97
In determining what priorities should be given to different
health care services in the standard package, the Oregon Health
Service Commission solicited public input through consulta-
tion.98 The priorities accorded to services as a result of this
93 These services generally include the following: inpatient hospital services;
outpatient hospital services; prenatal care; vaccines for children; physician services;
nursing facility services for persons aged twenty-one or older; family planning ser-
vices and supplies; rural health clinic services; home health care for persons eligible
for skilled-nursing services; laboratory and x-ray services; pediatric and family nurse
practitioner services and nurse-midwife services. HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMiN., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., MEDICAID SERVICES, at www.hcfa.goc/medi-
caid/mservice.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2002). The U.S. Health Care Financing
Administration has been renamed the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
94 The following Medicaid recipients, however, must be excluded from cost
sharing: pregnant women, children under age eighteen, and hospital or nursing home
patients who are expected to contribute most of their income to institutional care. Id.
In addition, all Medicaid recipients must be exempt from co-payments for emergency
services and family planning services. Id.
95 See COLLEEN M. FLOOD, INTERNATIONAl HEALTH CARE REFORM: A LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 156-57 (2000) (noting that the Oregon Health
Service Commission used public input in establishing the ranking system for cover-
age). 9 6 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 414.705-.751 (1999).
97 See Caitlin Halligan, Note, "Just What the Doctor Ordered: Oregon's
Medicaid Rationing Process and Public Participation in Risk Regulation 83 GEO.
L.J. 2697, 2703 n.21 (1995) ("Prior to passage of the reforms, only those individuals
who satisfied family status requirements and had incomes equal to or less than 51%
of the poverty line were eligible for Oregon Medicaid services.").
98 See id. at 2708-11 (discussing OHSC's public soliticiation processes).
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process were the subject of much criticism. In particular, physi-
cians criticized the fact that some routine procedures were
ranked over life-saving treatments. 99 Physicians were particu-
larly concerned that the ranking violated the ethical "rule of
rescue" requiring physicians to act in the case of a life-
threatening situation. As a result of these criticisms, the Com-
mission recompiled the list of priorities using a methodology
that largely eliminated cost considerations and diluted the influ-
ence of public input.
Between 1990 and 1997, the percentage of uninsured Ore-
gon residents dropped from 18% to 11% and there was a sig-
nificant drop in the levels of uncompensated care in hospitals.ea
The end result of the Oregon process was that essentially the
same package of benefits that had previously been available to
Medicaid recipients was extended to more people-in other
words few services were dropped from the list to be publicly
funded. 01 It seems that if the rationing process is made explicit
then there is little political will to actually enforce hard ration-
ing criteria. Although those who are in favor cost containment
may therefore think that implicit rationing is to be preferred
over explicit rationing, the latter seems a much fairer, transpar-
ent, and more accountable method. The consultation model em-
ployed in Oregon represents an important innovation in devel-
oping processes for making difficult choices between cost and
quality, and warrants close study by other nations looking to
develop fair rationing processes.
4. Court Challenges
Since the advent of managed care there have been numer-
ous cases challenging limitations by insurance companies on the
range of health care services supplied. Initially it was difficult
for patients to attach liability to managed care organizations
(MCOs) in malpractice actions and patients were left with re-
99 Id. at 2712 (noting, for example, that tooth capping for exposed roots
ranked above surgery for ectopic pregnancy, even though the surgery is nearly 100%
effective in treating an otherwise serious condition).
100 Howard M. Leichter, Oregon's Bold Experiment: Whatever Happened to
Rationing?, 24 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 147, 158 (1999).
101 See Lawrence Jacobs et al., The Oregon Health Plan and the Political
Paradox of Rationing : What Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon
Did, 24 . HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 161, 166-168 (1999) (reviewing the myths, reali-
ties, and politics of health care rationing in Oregon under the Oregon Health Plan
(OHP)).
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course only through suits against physicians or other providers.
However, as MCOs have undertaken increasingly pivotal roles
in decisions affecting the delivery of health care, judges have
begun to impose liability as incentive payments and other as-
pects of the inner workings of MCOs are better understood. The
result has been that MCOs are now in certain situations being
held liable for failure to manage the care that they arrange.10 2
Federal legislation in the form of the Employee Retirement In-
come and Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)1°3 still places limits on
the capacity of patients to sue managed care plans, as the ER-
ISA legislation largely pre-empts state regulation of self-
insuring employee benefit plans.1°4 The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Pegram v. Herdrich05 that patients cannot file federal
ERISA lawsuits over health plans' financial incentives to deny
care. It appears the Court was concerned about the prospect of
turning the federal courts into a venue for malpractice cases.
However, more recently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Pappas v. Asbel'06 found, notwithstanding the Pegram decision,
that managed care plans that make "mixed"'1 7 decisions can be
sued by patients in state courts for negligence in their medical
decisionmaking.
Class actions against MCOs are emerging. In late 1999, a
large number of new class action lawsuits covering over thirty-
two million managed care enrollees were launched against sev-
eral large MCOs.10 8 The actions, brought under federal anti-
racketeering legislation, allege that the MCOs promised a cer-
tain level of quality but knowingly failed to deliver it by deny-
"0 Edward F. Shay, Managed Care Liability, PHYSICIAN'S NEWS DIGEST,
Nov. 1996, http:llwww.physiciansnews.comllaw/1196shay.html.
10329 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
104 See Jesselyn Alicia Brown, ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Road-
block or Scapegoat? 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 339, 345 (1995) (noting that the ER-
ISA preemption clause is very broad, since "[p]reemption is presumed if the sate law
'relate[s] to' any employee benefit plan").
105 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (holding that HMO doctors' mixed treatment and
eligibility decisions are not considered fiduciary decisions under the meaning of ER-
ISA).
106 768 A.2d 1089 (2001).
107 This is a decision in which administrative (or coverage) benefit deter-
minations are intertwined with medical judgment.
108 Rebecca Porter, Millennium Ends with Wave of Class Actions Against
HMOs, TRIAL, Feb. 2000, at 94, 95 (stating that some of the groups that were sued
included Prudential Insurance Co. of America, CIGNA Corp., Foundation Health
Systems, Humana, Inc., and PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc.).
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ing needed services in order to increase profits. 1°9 Among the
allegations are that the MCOs apply pressure through financial
incentives for physicians-often hidden from the patient-in
order to cut costs by rationing medical services on the basis of
available resources, as much as on medical need. Clearly these
kinds of large class actions, if successful, may have a huge im-
pact on the development of managed care in the United States.
There have been court challenges to rationing on the part of
various Medicaid programs as well. Some of the challenges
have focuses on arguments that the State in question has vio-
lated the Federal Medicaid funding requirements; however,
these kinds of challenges are generally unsuccessful, as the fed-
eral requirements afford states a wide discretion.1 Other chal-
lenges have focused on constitutional rights to equal treatment
but do not seem to have met with great success."'
5. Patients' Bill of Rights
On the tail of the managed care revolution in the United
States has been a flurry of federal and state legislation aimed at
protecting those with insurance from limitations on access to
and diminishment in quality of health care. It should be noted
that these regulatory measures do not generally seek to expand
the numbers of people covered by private insurance but rather
comprise a set of consumer rights protecting those who already
have private insurance.
'09 Id. at 95.
110 See, e.g., DeSario v. Thomas, 139 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the
coverage of durable medical equipment (DME) in Connecticut and finding the dis-
trict court erred in concluding that those challenging the State's regulations for cov-
erage of DME under Medicaid were likely to be successful), cert granted, Slekis v.
Thomas, 525 U.S. 1098 (1999).
11 See, e.g., Dexter v. Kirschner, 972 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1992), amended by
984 F.2d 979 (1993). In Dexter, a Medicaid claimant unsuccessfully challenged Ari-
zona's refusal under its Medicaid program to pay for a leukemia treatment that is far
more effective but more costly than the leukemia treatment it was prepared to fund.
The main claim was that the decision to fund one, but not another, treatment for leu-
kemia amounted to a violation of the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause. In
other words, by refusing to fund all medically effective leukemia treatments, Arizona
treated similarly situated leukemia patients differently solely on their ability to pay
privately. The court said that 'similarly situated' means "all patients who can be ef-
fectively treated by the same organ transplant procedure." Id. at 1119-1120. "There-
fore, [the plaintiff] was not unreasonably denied a covered service. She was denied
medical assistance because the only procedure that could help her... was not cov-
ered by the AHCCCS." Id. at 1120.
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Explicit rationing by managed care plans regarding the
scope of coverage, duration of benefits, premiums, and choice
of providers is regulated, mostly at the state level, by legislative
minimum standards as well as by "Patients' Bills of Rights" in
many states. In 1996 the U.S. federal government enacted the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)11 2
in an effort to reduce the worst effects of risk-avoidance tech-
niques by private insurers and to improve the portability of
health insurance for the employed. Although not directly tack-
ling the problem of the uninsured in the system, the Act ad-
dresses public concerns over insurers, employers, and managed
care plans dropping coverage for people once they become in
need of expensive health care services. The Act amends the fed-
eral ERISA legislation that, as a result, now prohibits health
insurers, including self-insuring employers and managed care
plans, from limiting or denying coverage for pre-existing condi-
tions for more than twelve months. After this twelve-month pe-
riod, coverage is portable to the extent that no new waiting pe-
riod is allowed to be imposed if an employer switches insurers
or if an employee changes jobs, provided that the employee in
question maintains coverage with a gap no longer than sixty-
three days.Y3 Employers are now prohibited from denying cov-
erage to an employee or dropping an employee from coverage
or charging a higher premium because of that person's, or a de-
pendant's, health status or medical history.11 4 Other provisions
of the Act prevent insurers and managed care plans from deny-
ing coverage to small employee groups or to those individuals
who at some point have had group insurance coverage for eight-
een months or more and are ineligible for coverage from any
other source.11 5 There is nothing, however, to prevent private
insurers charging very high premiums to these individuals.
Both the U.S. House of Representatives1 6 and the U.S.
Senate' 17 have passed Bills providing for a Bill of Patients'
112 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
113 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2000). A pre-existing condition restriction can only
relate to a medical condition diagnosed or treated some time during the six months
preceding the twelve month waiting period and cannot be imposed on newborns,
newly adopted children less than eighteen years old, or pregnant women. Id. §
1181(d)(1)-(3).
114 See 29 U.S.C. § 1182
115 Brian K. Atchinson & Daniel M. Fox, The Politics of the Health Insurance
Portabilit and Accountability Act, May-June 1997, at 147.
11 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, H.R. 2563, 107th Cong. (2001).
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Rights. The Bill passed by the Republican House of Representa-
tives varies in some important respects from that passed by the
Democratic U.S. Senate so that difficult negotiations are ahead
as representatives try to broker a deal that will meet the ap-
proval of the Senate, the House, and the President. Both Bills
provide national standards of entitlements for those with exist-
ing health insurance ensuring; for example, access to specialists,
government-sponsored clinical trials, and emergency services. 8
Both Bills also enable patients to appeal decisions of a managed
care plan to an independent review board 119 and both also over-
take, to varying extents, the limitations of ERISA, enabling pa-
tients to sue health care plans in state courts. It is in this latter
aspect that the Bill passed by the House of Representatives dif-
fers significantly from the Senate Bill. The House Bill places
the following kinds of limits on patients' capacity to sue man-
aged care plans in state courts: damage claims for pain and suf-
fering limited to $1.5 million 20 compared to the $5 million cap
in the Senate Bill;121 punitive damages limited to $1.5 million; 122
and any suit in a state court would be subject to special federal
standards including a higher standard of proof requiring the
plaintiff to overcome a "presumption (rebuttable by clear and
convincing evidence) that the designated decisionmaker exer-
cised ordinary care in making such determination."123
Where managed care plans give incentives to health care
professionals to contain costs, implicit rationing may occur. 24
This rationing is more difficult to regulate, although measures
have been proposed and adopted to attempt to ensure a proper
balance between medical necessity and cost factors in the pa-
tient-provider relationship. Schwartz groups managed care regu-
latory measures into five broad categories according to the pur-
117 Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001).
118 See S. 1052 §§ 114 (explaining timely access to specialists), 119 (provid-
ing coverage for individuals participating in approved clinical trials), 113 (explaining
access to emergency care); H.R. 2563 (same sections)
19 See S. 1052, §§ 101-104; H.R. 2563 (same sections).
'
20 H.R. 2563, § 402(a).
121 S. 1052, § 402(a).
'22 H.R. 2563 at § 402(a).
123 Id.
124 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health Care Is
Medically Necessary?, 340 Naw ENG. J. MND. 229 (1999) (stating that implicit in the
concept of 'professional control' is "the belief that insurers should have the power to
make a conclusive and nonreviewable decision that a particular service is unneces-
sary and therefore excluded from coverage").
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poses they serve.' 25 For example, forty-eight of the fifty States
prohibit the use of "gag clauses," where managed care plans
prohibit physicians from discussing matters like treatments the
plan does not cover, attempted referrals from the doctor refused
by the plan, and financial incentives under which doctors de-
liver care. 126 Similarly, the Bills providing for a Federal Pa-
tients' Bill of Rights provide for the prohibition of gag
clauses. 127
E. New Zealand
1. Public/Private Mix
The New Zealand system is predominantly publicly funded,
but the share of public funding has been declining. In 1980,
public spending comprised 88% of total health care spending1 28
but had declined to 77.1% by 1998.129 The decline in the per
capita public share of health spending in New Zealand was the
most dramatic in the OECD.13' The share paid by private insur-
ance increased slightly from 6.1% in 1993/1994 to 6.8% in
1996/1997.131 However, the greatest growth has been in out-of-
pocket payments by patients, which increased from 10.4% of all
health care spending in 1979/1980 to 15.9% in 1998/1999.132
Average statistics conceal the fact that there is variation be-
tween health care services with respect to the public/private
mix. For example, in 1998/1999, the government contributed
almost 100% of public hospital spending yet only 61% of com-
munity care (personal care including family doctor visits)
spending. 133 In the year ending June 1999 the sums paid out-of-
pocket by patients amounted to approximately 28% of drug
125 Robert L. Schwartz, How Law and Regulation Shape Managed Care, in
MANAGED CARE: FINANCIAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 29 (David A.
Bennahum ed., 1999).126 Id. at 31.
127 S. 1052, § 131-135; H.R. 2563, §§ 131-135.
128 OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
129 NEw ZEALAND MINISTRY OF HEALTH, HEALTH EXPENDITURE TRENDS IN
NEw ZEALAND 1980-99, at 44 (Aug. 2000), http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/ea6005
dc347e7bd44c2566a40079ae6f/1e72ae65cce8beb7cc2569740069be92/$FILE/hlthexp
end99.pdf.
'
30 See OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
131 NEw ZEALAND MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 129, at 54.
132 Id.
133 See id. at 60-61.
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spending, 30% of spending on family doctor visits and 58% of
specialists' visits.13 Although overall still a small proportion,
private insurers play an important role in the funding of particu-
lar health care services such as non-emergency surgical ser-
vices, specialist services, and family doctor charges.
2. Philosophical Approach
The philosophical approach to health care in New Zealand
is that care should be allocated on the basis of need and not
ability to pay. However, there are limitations to how far this
principle is applied. First, there is a long entrenched system of
unregulated private payments, which are out-of-pocket pay-
ments and private insurance, for family doctor services. Second,
a "two-tier" system is allowed so that individuals with sufficient
resources or private insurance can receive specialist care or
elective surgery in the private sector and jump long queues in
the public system.
3. Processes for Determining What Is Publicly Funded
How is it decided what is in and out of the publicly funded
sector in New Zealand and what processes are used to ration
health care? In New Zealand, it is based on a crucial distinction
between the funding of hospital services and the funding of
medical services. Family doctors have retained the right to
charge patients whatever they wish for their services over and
above whatever subsidy/payment is made by the government.1 35
Since 1941, government subsidies have failed to keep pace with
the charges fixed by family doctors and an increasing propor-
tion of this care has been privately financed. Also, people who
wish to avoid long queues for specialists' services or elective
surgery can buy care from specialists and in private hospitals.
Apart from rationing by way of price, implicit rationing within
the boundaries of the publicly funded system also occurs. Suc-
cessive governments have restricted the flow of public re-
sources into the public system and have relied on implicit ra-
tioning, whereby physicians allocate limited public resources,
'34 See id. at 57
13- See IN HAY, THE CARING COMMODITY: THE PROVISION OF HEALTH
CARE iN NEW ZEALAND 121 (1989) (indicating that a restriction preventing physicians
from accepting payment from patients in excess of government subsidy was removed
in the Social Security Amendment Bill).
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such as hospitals beds, technology, and nursing services, across
various health needs.1
36
The 1993 "internal market" reforms saw the introduction of
explicit rationing and an attempt to develop a more principled
approach to what services would be publicly funded. 137 A Na-
tional Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Ser-
vices (Core Services Committee) 38 was created and charged
with giving independent advice to the Minister of Health on
which core services should be purchased, how they should be
distributed, and the terms of access on which they should be
available. It was initially thought that the health and disability
services that should be publicly funded could be identified in a
list. To this end, the Committee consulted consumers and pro-
viders around New Zealand. However, by October 1994 this
approach was rejected, 39 the Committee having determined that
compiling such a list would be complex, time-consuming, ex-
pensive, and divisive."40 Instead, it recommended to the gov-
ernment that the then-publicly funded health and disability ser-
vices become the core-such services representing the "values
and priorities of several past generations of New Zealanders. ' ' 4
136 See ROBERT H. BLANK, NEW ZEALAND HEALTH PoLIcy: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 98 (1994).
137 According to the then Minister of Health, Simon Upton, defining a set of
"core health services" more explicitly would help ensure that the services the public
believe to be the most important would be provided. SIMON UPTON, YoUR HEALTH
AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH: A STATEMENT OF GOVERNMENT HEALTH POLIcY 80 (1991).
It would also acknowledge more honestly that there are limits to the health services
the government could afford.
138 In January 1996 the Core Services Committee was renamed the National
Advisory Committee on Health and Disability. NAT'L HEALTH COMM., ROLE OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND DISABILITY, http://www.nhc.
govt.nz/aboutlrolenhc.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
139 The Core Services Committee stated:
In the two and a half years we have been working to define core services,
the Committee has found that on clinical grounds alone, without any con-
sideration of fairness or equity, explicitly identifying core services is not as
straightforward as might first have been thought possible. A 'yes/no' or
'in/out' list approach is just too simplistic. It would either have to be so
broad and lacking in definition as to be meaningless, much the situation the
Committee inherited, or its explicitness would make it too arbitrary and in-
flexible resulting in people being unfairly excluded from services. Either
way it would fail.
Lynette Jones, Core Services Committee: The Core Debate 3, in ALAN MAYNARD &
KAREN BLOOR, OUR CERTAIN FATE: RATIONING IN HEALTH CARE 28 (1998).
140 BLANK, supra note 136, at 105.
141 Id.
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It also recommended the development of guidelines and clinical
assessment criteria to help define when a new service was of
sufficient clinical benefit to warrant public funding. The most
recent raft of reforms being implemented by the La-
bour/Alliance government retains the concept of explicit ration-
ing. The New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000
provides that the Minister of Health can appoint a national advi-
sory committee on health and disability which will be charged
with the task, among others, of advising the Minister on "the
kinds, and relative priorities, of public health services, personal
health services, and disability support services that should, in
the committee's opinion, be publicly funded." 142 The lesson for
other jurisdictions from this experience is that attempting to de-
fine a fixed list of services to be publicly funded is difficult and
may flounder, but there is fruit to be had in establishing proc-
esses to determine priorities in health care spending within a
publicly funded system.
4. Court Challenges
As in other jurisdictions, the introduction of explicit ration-
ing has resulted in some court challenges in New Zealand. The
most contentious case involved a sixty-three-year-old man, Rau
Williams, suffering from renal failure, diabetes, and dementia,
who was denied access to renal dialysis treatment by a Regional
Health Authority (Northland Health). 43 A relative of Mr. Wil-
liams' applied to overturn this decision but was unsuccessful
both in the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Court of
Appeal found that the Health Authority did not deny care be-
cause it was rationing limited resources; rather, it was a case
about the appropriateness of a clinical decision. This case gen-
erated a large amount of public interest and debate. Examples of
media statements include the following: "Two top kidney doc-
tors say the refusal to give Rau Williams renal dialysis is a ra-
tioning decision ... Mr[J McKeown's renal physician is also
reported as saying: [']Northland's explanation that Mr[.] Wil-
liams was denied treatment on purely clinical grounds . . . is
only 80% of the story."" 44 This case and the media commentary
around it highlight the murky divide between "clinical deci-
142 Public Act 2000, No. 91, § 13(1)(a).
143 Shortland v Northland Health Ltd. [1998] 1 NZRL 433 (C.A.).
144 Colin M. Feek et al., Experience with Rationing Health Care in New Zea-
land, 318 BRrr. MED. J. 1346, 1348 (1999).
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sions," "resource allocation," and "rationing" and the need for
citizens to know that there are fair and transparent processes for
allocating public health care.
5. Patients' Bill or Charter of Rights
The Code of Health and Disability Services Consumer
Rights came into force in New Zealand on 1 July 1996. New
Zealand's Health and Disability Commissioner is charged with
promoting the rights of consumers and investigating potential
breaches of the Code. An awareness survey in 1999 showed that
there had been a steady increase in public awareness of the
Code and of the role of the Commissioner. 45 The Code pre-
scribes ten rights: (1) the right to be treated with respect; (2) the
right to freedom from discrimination, coercion, harassment, and
exploitation; (3) the right to dignity and independence; (4) the
right to services of an appropriate standard; (5) the right to ef-
fective communication; (6) the right to be fully informed; (7)
the right to make fully informed choices and decisions; (8) the
right to support; (9) rights in respect of teaching or research;
and (10) the right to complain. Clearly, these rights are
largely rights of a patient vis-h-vis a health professional and
most are already recognized at common law and in medical
codes of ethics. Of interest is that despite "internal market re-
forms" in New Zealand in 1993 that provided for Regional
Health Authorities to take on a proactive purchasing and man-
agement role, the Code of Rights does not speak to rights of pa-
tients or citizens vis-a-vis Regional Health Authorities. More-
over, although waiting lists and times are an issue of significant
concern to New Zealanders. The Code of Rights does not con-
tain any provisions to ensure the delivery of timely care.
F. United Kingdom
1. Public/Private Mix
Although the percentage of health care paid for by the pub-
lic sector has declined, the United Kingdom still has one of the
145 See RON PATTERSON, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE HEALTH AND DIsABILITy
COMMIssIoNER 17-18 (1999).
146 The Knowledge Basket, The Code of Health and Disability Services
Consumers' Rights, http://www.knowledge-basket.co.nzlhdc/aboutlrghtindx.html
(last visited Jan 26, 2002).
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higher percentages of public funding in the OECD. In 1999,
government funded 84.2% of total health care spending. 47 Of
total health care spending, approximately 3.5% is attributable to
private insurers and 11% to out of pocket payments by pa-
tients. 148 Private insurance and out of pocket payments fund pri-
vate elective surgeries, as well as user charges for pharmaceuti-
cals, eye and dental care. For pharmaceuticals, however, 60% of
the population are exempt from the requirements for user
charges' 49 because of their low incomes or because they are de-
fined as chronically ill.
2. Philosophical Approach
The philosophical principle of the UK's National Health
Service (NHS) has long been that care should be allocated on
the basis of need and not ability to pay. 150 Legislation requires
that the Secretary of State, to such an extent as he or she con-
siders necessary to meet all reasonable requirements, has a duty
to provide (and not merely insure) hospital and other like ac-
commodation, medical, dental, nursing and ambulance services,
maternity and young child care, preventative, acute and conva-
lescent care, and services required for the diagnosis and treat-
ment of illness. However, there is no guidance about how health
care services should be allocated or prioritized amongst differ-
ent health care needs.
3. Processes for Determining What Is Publicly Funded
The U.K. system has a long history of providing public
coverage for a comprehensive range of health care services in-
cluding prescription drugs. In terms of how public resources are
147 OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.148 id.
149 Note that over eighty percent of prescriptions are dispensed to those
who are exempt.
150 in introducing the National Health Service Plan in July 2000, Prime Minis-
ter Tony Blair stated:
The NHS was the greatest achievement of the post-war Labour Govern-
ment. It was based on one solid founding principle: that health care should
be given on the basis of a person's need not their wealth.... mhis side of
the House will never abandon what was one of the greatest civilising acts
of emancipation this century has ever known.
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Statement on the National Health Service Plan (July
27, 2000), in 10 DOWNING ST. NEWSROOM, at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/
news.asp?Newsld =1 166&Sectionld=32.
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allocated, the U.K. system has historically relied on implicit
rationing by physicians as "gatekeepers" to the health care sys-
tem. It has also relied on implicit rationing through Health Au-
thorities and public hospitals having to work within the confines
of a capped annual budget. More recently, however, there has
been a shift to more forms of explicit rationing by centrally de-
termining how to rank priorities in health care spending. In
1992, the government issued Health of the Nation, setting out
the government's health strategy and identifying key areas for
action by the NHS and others. This strategy set national and
local health targets in five key areas. In 1998, the Labour gov-
ernment introduced a new policy, which set health targets to be
met by the year 2010. The newly created National Institute for
Clinical Excellence is also meant to issue evidence-based guid-
ance on the cost-effectiveness of selected services and will rec-
ommend whether such services should be used across the coun-
try.
4. Court Challenges
As in other jurisdictions, explicit rationing decisions have
been the subject of court challenges with patients bringing judi-
cial review actions to challenge funding decisions. Regina v.
Cambridge District Health Authority1 52 involved a ten-and-a-
half-year-old girl who had been given six to eight weeks to live,
where the doctors treating her were of the opinion that she
should be given no further remedial treatment. The patient's
father sought the opinion of two further medical experts, both of
whom were of the opinion that further treatment, including a
second bone marrow transplant, was possible. However, be-
cause of the unavailability of beds in the only NHS hospital
prepared to carry out such treatment, the treatment could only
be provided in a private facility. The patient's father requested
therefore the Health Authority responsible for his daughter's
care to allocate funds for the treatment in this private facility.
The Health Authority refused. The court held that while the
Health Authority owes a statutory duty to provide medical ser-
vices, there is discretion as to how that duty is to be fulfilled.153
Nevertheless, the father's action was successful to the extent
151 DEP'T OF HEALTH, HEALTH OF THE NATION: A STRATEGY FOR HEALTH
IN ENGLAND (1992).
152 [1995] 1 FLR 1055 (QB).
153 Id.
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that the Health Authority, while not ordered to fund the treat-
ment, was required to reconsider its decision on several
grounds. One of these grounds was that the Health Authority
had referred to resource constraints but had not adequately ex-
plained the funding priorities that had led to its decision. 54
Explicit rationing by a Health Authority was the subject of
litigation in a more recent case, Regina v. North West Lanca-
shire Health Authority.15 5 This case involved a challenge to a
Health Authority's refusal to pay for gender reassignment sur-
gery following its allocation of a low priority to such surgery,
which it considered achieved little or no clinical gain.1 56 The
Court of Appeal applied the decision in the Cambridge case,
noting Sir Thomas Bingham's statement that the courts "will
not seek to allocate scarce resources in a tight budget but will
ensure that the Health Authority has asked the right questions
and has addressed the right issues before arriving at a policy
that is lawful." 157 On the facts, the court found that the Health
Authority had failed to take relevant matters into consideration
in allocating a low priority to gender reassignment surgery.
Such matters included the question of what is a proper treatment
or what is recognized as the illness involved in gender identity
dysphoria. Rather, it was found that the decision was made tak-
ing into consideration irrelevant matters. The Health Authority
was ordered to reformulate its policy accordingly.
These English cases suggest that while courts will be re-
spectful of public authorities taking decisions in the context of
constrained public resources, they will not simply accept the
argument of constrained resources and will wish to be assured
that the public authorities have a principled basis for resource
allocation.
154 Id.
5 [2000] 1 W.L.R. 977 (C.A).
156 In addition, in Regina v. North East Devon Health Auth., [2001] Q.B. 213,
230 (Eng. C.A.), the court stated:
Recent history has demonstrated that the pace of developments as to what
is possible by way of medical treatment, coupled with the ever increasing
expectations of the public, mean that the resources of the NHS are, and are
likely to continue, at least in the foreseeable future, to be insufficient to
meet demand.... [Section] 3(1) of [the National Health Service Act 1977]
does not impose an absolute duty to provide the specified services. The
Secretary of State is entitled to have regard to the resources made available
to him under current government economic policy.
157 North West Lancashire Health Authority, [2000] 1 W.L.R. at 988.
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5. Patients' Bill of Rights
A U.K. "Patients' Charter" was introduced in 1992, with
the aim of improving the quality of health service delivery. The
Charter published standards of service that people should ex-
pect, and in doing so, emphasized quality improvement and the
attainment of specific service delivery standards such as maxi-
mum waiting times. The Charter included broad guarantees at
the level of principle, such as the right to "receive health care
on the basis of clinical need, regardless of the ability to pay."1
58
The one statement in the Charter that entailed an identifiable
standard related to waiting lists. Patients were to be "guaranteed
admission for virtually all treatments by a specific date" within
two years, subsequently reduced to eighteen months and then to
a target of twelve months for some procedures.159 In addition to
"rights" the Charter also set out nine "standards" including re-
spect for privacy, dignity, and religious beliefs, and also in rela-
tion to waiting times, such as a guarantee of being seen within
thirty minutes in an outpatient clinic. However, while the Char-
ter provided a complaints mechanism, it did not create legally
enforceable rights.
The Charter has now been replaced by a NHS "Guide",
which tells patients what they can expect. 60 It is a guide to pa-
tients' rights and responsibilities, and highlights the standards
and services people can expect from the NHS, including how
long a patient can expect to wait before receiving treatment. As
with the Charter that preceded it, the guide provides for patients
to make complaints but does not create new legally enforceable
rights. Criticism has been made of the new NHS Guide for not
explicitly setting out what patients entitlements are, thus it is
argued, making it more difficult for patients to stand up for
themselves. For example, whereas the old "Patients' Charter"
specifically stated that patients over the age of seventy-five had
a right to a yearly health check the new NHS Guide makes
158 Chester & Ellesmere Port Community Health Council, The Patient's
Charter (n.d.), http://www.nhswatchdog.com/charter.htm (last visited July 1,
2002).
159 Id.
160 Press Release, U.K. Department of Health, Guide Spells Out What Patients
Can Expect from the NHS, (Jan. 26, 2001), http://www.doh.gov.uktnewsdesk/ ar-
chive/jan200l/4-naa-26012001.html.
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much broader commitments to, for example, "work continu-
ously to improve quality services and to minimise errors." 161
As Canada and other public health care systems consider
how to ensure citizen satisfaction with their programs and en-
hance the accountability of the system to the people it services,
policy makers should consider in more detail the United King-
dom's experience with a Charter of Rights. Citizen concerns
about timeliness dominate public discourse in predominantly
publicly funded systems like the United Kingdom, New Zea-
land, and Canada, and threaten to undermine support for the
concept of public systems. The United Kingdom did appear to
have some success in reducing waiting times in the early part of
internal market reforms in the early 1990s. This appeared to be
achieved through incentives for Health Authorities and hospitals
(NHS Trusts) to achieve waiting lists targets. 62 Policy makers
in public funded systems should consider how to gear public
systems towards more timely treatment, perhaps through includ-
ing guarantees as to waiting times in a Patients' Bill of Rights,
coupled with incorporating incentives into the public system to
achieve these waiting time targets.
1II. EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF THE
PUBLIC/PRIVATE MIX ON HEALTH OUTCOMES,
UTILIZATION, SPENDING, AND WAITING TIMES
A. Health Outcomes
1. General
In this part of our paper we turn to examine cross-country
evidence on the correlation between health status and pub-
lic/private spending. We look at four measures of health: life
expectancy, infant mortality, the incidence of cancer in the
population, and potential years of life lost from all causes. 63 We
construct three summary measures of spending:
161 Are We Losing Our Rights as Patients? TIMES (London), July 17 2001, at
12.
162 See FLOOD, supra note 95, at 146-47 (discussing differences between the
United Kingdom and New Zealand in controlling waiting lists).
163 Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL) is a summary measure of premature
mortality which provides an explicit way of weighting deaths occurring at younger
ages, which are, a priori, preventable.
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1. how total spending on health as a percentage of GDP
is correlated with each of these measures of health
status.
2. how public spending on health as a percentage of
GDP is correlated with each of these measures.
3. how private spending on health as a share of total
health care spending is correlated with each of these
measures.
These are simple correlations that do not control for other vari-
ables such as the country's income or GDP, age distribution,
and spending on other areas of public health. We are simply re-
porting the correlation between various measures of health
spending and various measures of health across countries at a
single point in time, which is the most recent year for which
data were available. The data come from the OECD statistics on
each of these measures. Our results are shown in Table 3 in the
Appendix.
As Table 3 demonstrates, evidence from twenty-four
OECD countries for which consistent data are available' 64
shows how difficult it is to reach any conclusions about the re-
lationship between public/private spending and health out-
comes. For female life expectancy we calculate that there is a
positive and statistically significant correlation between total
health care spending as a percent of GDP and life expectancy.
However, for males, while the relationship is still positive, it is
not statistically significant. We find no correlation between pri-
vate health care spending as a share of total health care spend-
ing and life expectancy for either males or females. For infant
mortality, we find, on average, that there are fewer infant deaths
in those countries where health spending, as a share of GDP is
greater. For the incidence of cancer in the population we actu-
ally find higher levels of cancer in those countries with greater
health care spending as a share of GDP, probably reflecting that
people in those higher-spending countries are more likely to die
of "diseases of affluence" like cancer than other causes. Finally,
for potential years of life lost, we find a positive correlation be-
164 We omit the Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico and Poland be-
cause consistent data is not available for these countries.
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tween private health care spending as a percent of total health
spending and potential years of life lost. This might reflect, in
part, the fact that private spending tends to be skewed towards
the more well off individuals, where the returns to spending on
health are smaller and away from potentially more needy popu-
lations where the returns are larger. However, this measure is
only a simple correlation at a point in time, and it is beyond the
scope of this article to explore whether this correlation holds in
a multivariate, multiyear analysis. We do find some evidence
that public spending on health as a share of GDP is correlated
with better health outcomes. However, this result may be partly
capturing the fact that public spending on health care is also
correlated with public spending in a number of other areas that
contribute significantly to the health status of the population,
such as education, housing, and income redistribution. The fact
that we find no correlation between public health spending as a
share of total public spending and health outcomes is consistent
with this hypothesis and suggests that it may be public spending
on a variety of socially beneficial areas which improves popula-
tion health and not simply spending on health care.
To investigate the relationship between private/public
spending and health care further, we now turn to country spe-
cific studies that examine policy changes in health spending.
These studies are much more likely to provide results that can
be interpreted as a causal relationship between public/private
spending changes and health care outcomes.
2. Country Specific Evidence On Health Outcomes
Looking more closely at the structure and dynamics of se-
lected health care systems can provide considerably more in-
sight into the implications of various forms of private spending
on the health of the population, and its use of health care ser-
vices than can be achieved by looking across all OECD nations.
We begin by examining evidence on out-of-pocket payments for
health care services. Out-of-pocket payments are often sug-
gested as a way to increase private resources within the health
care system and as a way to decrease frivolous or unnecessary
use of health care services. The literature on cost-sharing and
health outcomes in developed countries is somewhat limited
since out-of-pocket payments play on average a small role in
financing most systems. Out-of-pocket payment by patients ac-
counted for a mere 2.7% of total health care spending in the
2002]
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United Kingdom, based on 1995 figures. 165 By comparison, in
1998, out-of-pocket payments accounted for 17.7% of total
health care spending in the United States, 22.9% in New Zea-
land, 16.2% in Australia, and 5.9% in the Netherlands. 166 The
1998 figures are not available for Canada; however, the 1997
figure was 17.1%.
The United States and New Zealand have the highest levels
of cost sharing for primary care, such as family doctor services,
and we summarize the relevant literature from the experience of
these two countries as well as research on cost-sharing con-
ducted in Canada. We focus on the United States, New Zealand,
and Canada for the following reasons. First, much of the re-
search on out-of-pocket payments has focused on the U.S. sys-
tem. Second, the New Zealand research explicitly examines
how out-of-pocket payments affect the first point of contact
with the health system-the family doctor. As in many coun-
tries, New Zealand uses family doctors as gatekeepers for the
rest of the system, and if out-of-pocket payments prevent indi-
viduals from seeing their family doctors, they will also prevent
individuals from accessing other parts of the health care system.
Canada has a sectoral model and while fully protecting hospital
and physician services, allows out-of-pocket payments for pre-
scription drugs, home care, etc. Despite Australia's high level of
out-of-pocket payments, we do not focus on Australia here as
most Australians who are considered unable to afford out-of-
pocket payments are exempted from paying them. Concessional167n
patients in Australia are exempted from out-of-pocket pay-
ments for physician services, there are no fees for public hospi-
tals, and there are significant safety-net provisions for pharma-
ceuticals. The absolute percentage of spending coming from
out-of-pocket payments may not be as important as who is re-
quired to make out-of-pocket payments and for what kinds of
services.
A large study of cost sharing in the United States suggests
that, unsurprisingly, increasing cost sharing decreases the num-
165 OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
166 id.
167 Concessional patients are people who receive certain pensions, benefits or
cards administered by the Departments of Family and Children's Services or Veter-
ans' Affairs, or who meet certain criteria for being declared to be disadvantaged.
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ber of health care services that people use. 168 People in the study
who had to pay nothing out-of-pocket used significantly more
health care services than those people who had to pay some fee
out of their own pocket. The exception to these findings was
hospital admissions of children, where it was found that even
where people had to pay out-of-pocket there was no difference
in the number of admissions. For those people above the pov-
erty line in the United States, increases in out-of-pocket pay-
ments did not seem to have any measurable effect on health out-
comes. Evidence from expansions in the Medicaid program for
poor children in the United States suggests that reducing out-of-
pocket payments increases the use of preventive care and de-
creases adverse health outcomes for children.169 Evidence from
New Zealand also suggests that out-of-pocket payments are bar-
riers to access. In New Zealand, many people have to pay the
full cost of a visit to their family doctor, although 37% of the
population have private insurance to help cover these costs.
170
There are government subsidies in place for those on lower in-
comes and those with chronic illness, but they still only cover
about half of the fee charged. In a 1997 study, Grant et al. found
that out-of-pocket payments are barriers to access for some
sectors of the population, and that New Zealanders are less able
to access basic primary care than the British, Canadians, or
Australians. 1 7
1
Additional evidence from Canada further supports the hy-
pothesis that out-of-pocket payments affect utilization and that
there is a disproportionate impact upon those with lower in-
comes. A Saskatchewan study from the 1970s on out-of-pocket
payments for physician services showed that utilization declined
among lower income groups, but actually increased among up-
per income groups during a period in which co-payments were
168 JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE & THE INSURANCE EXPERIMENT GROUP, FREE FOR
ALL?: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE ExPERIMENT 338, 338 (1993).
169 See Janet Currie & Jonathan Gruber, Health Insurance Eligibility, Utiliza-
tion of Medical Care, and Child Health, 111 Q. J. EcoN. 431, 456-457 (1996) (esti-
mating the effects of Medicaid eligibility on the use of health care resources using the
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)).
170 NEw ZEALAND MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 129, at 35.
171 Cameron C. Grant et al., Primary Care and Health Reform in New Zea-
land, 110 N.Z. MED. J. 35, 38 (1997); see also Cathy Schoen et al., Equity in Health
Care Across Five Nations: Summary Findings from an International Health Policy
Survey HEALTH PoL'Y, Apr. 2000, at 67 (reporting on New Zealander's and Austra-
lian's perceived inequities in access to care).
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in effect.1 72 Barer et al. have argued that these results can be at-
tributed to the behavior of physicians, who sought to compen-
sate for declining demand from lower-income individuals by
inducing higher levels of utilization by less price-sensitive up-
per-income individuals.173
Out-of-pocket payments play a much larger role in the pre-
scription drug market in Canada than in other parts of the health
care system. Eighty-eight percent of Canadians have some form
of prescription drug coverage (69% are covered by private plans
and 19% by government), but almost all plans, be they private
or public, include deductibles and/or co-payments.' 74 Among
provincial public plans, the trend over the past ten years has
been towards increasing out-of-pocket payments to help control
drug spending. A study of the Quebec provincial drug plan
found that out-of-pocket payments reduced both the utilization
of medications and the health of beneficiaries. For lower in-
come individuals-those receiving income security payments-
prescription drug use fell by 14.7%. 75 Tamblyn notes the possi-
bility that individuals have died in Quebec due to lack of
medication. 176
What lessons are there for countries considering whether to
maintain or introduce out-of-pocket payments as a way of trying
to ensure the fiscal sustainability? Out-of-pocket payments will
reduce the use of health care services, provided of course that
people simply do not purchase private insurance to reimburse
them for the costs incurred, and this may produce some savings.
However, there may also be some costs if people don't receive
the treatment they need at an early stage and the system ends up
having to treat a more acute condition. Any savings in spending
will result disproportionately in reductions in utilization by
those on lower incomes. While out-of-pocket payments are
unlikely to affect the health outcomes of the relatively well off,
they are likely to negatively affect the health outcomes of the
172 See R.G. Beck & J. M. Home, Economic Class and Risk Avoidance: Ex-
perience Under Public Medical Care Insurance, 43 J. RISK & INSUR. 73, 73 (1976).
173 Morris Barer, Robert Evans & Greg Stoddard, CONTROLLING HEALTH CARE
COSTS BY DIRECT CHARGES TO PATIENTS: SNARE OR DELUSION? 33-34
(1979). 174 HEALTH CANADA, supra note 24.
175 Robyn Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated With Prescription
Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor and Elderly Persons, 285 JAMA 421 (2001),
http://jama.ama-assn.org/issues/v285n4/rfull/jocOO341.html.
176 Id.
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poor. Therefore, if out-of-pocket payments are introduced, there
needs to be careful consideration of how to ensure that those on
lower incomes are not deterred from getting the care they need.
Lessons may be taken from Australia here, which has a compli-
cated system in place ensuring that Concessional patients are
protected from having to pay out-of-pocket costs. It should be
kept in mind, however, that implementing a system of out-of-
pocket payments and accompanying safety nets will increase the
administrative costs of running the system. These latter costs
may in some cases outweigh any cost savings.
177
B. Utilization of Health Care Services
Health care spending is a function of the price paid for
health services and the quantity of services used. Countries
which have higher levels of spending could simply be paying
higher prices for a given quantity and quality of services (i.e.,
paying their health care professionals more for delivery of the
same services) or could be consuming more of those services at
the same prices. Evidence comparing the use of family doctors
in Canada versus the United States suggests that it is primarily
the former. As the data in Table 1 suggests, the United States
spends considerably more on health care, including on primary
physician care. Researchers examining the source of these dif-
ferences conclude that Canadians do not receive fewer primary
physician visits than their American counterparts; in fact, they
appear to go to their family doctors more often than the average
American. 178 Further evidence comparing hospital expenditures
in Canada versus the United States reaches similar conclusions.
A study published in 1988 by Newhouse et al. concludes that
despite large differences in expenditures between the two coun-
tries, Canadians do not spend less time in the hospital than
177 For example, the New Zealand government abandoned its $50 a night
patient user charge for public hospitals partly because of a public outcry, but also
partly because of the high administrative costs involved with collection. By the end
of the first quarter (May 1992), after the introduction of out-of-pocket payments for
public hospital services, outstanding debts fell in the range of 30-60% of total reve-
nue from charges. Toni Ashton, Charging for Health Services-Some Anecdotes from
the Antipodes, in STRATEGIC ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT 16 (M. Malck et
al., eds., 1993).
17s See Victor R. Fuchs & James S. Hahn, How Does Canada Do It?: A Com-
parison of Expenditures for Physicians' Services in the United States and Canada,
323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 884, 887-888 (1990) (observing that, in the United States, the
quantity of services per capita is lower than in Canada).
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Americans; in fact, they tend to spend longer as inpatients, on
average.179 A study published in 1998, comparing back and neck
hospitalizations in the province of Ontario and Washington
State, found that surgical back and neck hospitalizations were
three times as common in Washington. However, medical hos-
pitalizations were twice as common in Ontario and people in
Ontario were hospitalized longer for both surgical and non-
surgical hospitalizations. 180 Thus the evidence tends to suggest
that Americans receive higher volumes of surgical and intensive
kinds of care but that Canadians receive higher volumes of pri-
mary and preventive care.
What should Canada conclude from the evidence on service
volumes and private spending? Increasing private spending will
not necessarily increase the amount of care Canadians receive.
In fact, it appears that Canadians already receive the same level
of care, if not more care, as do Americans. However, private
spending is likely to shift the mix of services that are performed
on patients towards more expensive technologies and increase
the price paid for services. Whether these technologies are more
effective at providing care, and the value that patients may put
on this care, is also important to consider, but beyond the scope
of this article.
C. Health Care Spending
Among the OECD countries we investigate, the United
Kingdom has the largest share of public financing of health care
expenditures, comprising 84% of all health care expenditures. 181
Among the countries examined, the United Kingdom also
spends the least on health as a fraction of GDP - 5.8% in
1997.182 At the other extreme, the United States finances only
46% of health care expenditures publicly and spends the most
on health care as a fraction of GDP - 13.9% in 1997.113 Com-
179 See Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Hospital Spending in the United States and
Canada: A Comparison, HEALTH AFFS., Winter 1988, at 6, 10-11 (1988) (finding
that the hospital length of stay for people over age sixty-five in Ontario and Manitoba
is several days longer than the average stay for that same group in the United States
as a whole).
180 Victoria M. Taylor et al., Hospitalizations for Back and Neck Problems: A
Comparison Between the Province of Ontario and Washington State, 33 HEALTH
SERVS. REs. 929, 942 (1998).
181 OECD HEALTH DATA, supra note 5.
182 id.
183 Id.
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parisons across OECD countries have found some support for
the hypothesis that predominately public payers are able control
growth in health care prices better than predominantly private
payers. Research by Globerman and Vining looks at the rela-
tionship between the public share of health care financing in
1980 in OECD countries and the extent to which health care
price inflation exceeded general inflation between 1980 and
1996. Their findings suggest that the higher the public share of
financing, the lower the increase in prices, supporting the hy-
pothesis that public payers keep prices down"8 . Thus there is
some evidence to support the idea that more public spending is
associated with a better capacity to restrain growth in health
care prices, and the United States experience of relatively very
high rates of private financing is associated with high overall
health care spending. However, when we examine a larger
number of OECD countries but exclude the United States we
can find no statistical correlation between public spending and
control of total health care spending as a percentage of GDP.
18 5
Most countries, with the notable exception of the United States,
do have high rates of public financing, suggesting that relatively
small differences in the total amount of private financing be-
tween countries is not enough to have a significant impact on
prices. What is required is an examination of different sectors
that have much higher rates of private financing than the aver-
age. For example, private financing accounts for 64% of spend-
ing on the drug sector in Canada and the growth in spending on
drugs has been approximately 9% per year since 1987,186 much
higher than the growth rate in spending on hospital and medical
care, which are close to 100% publicly funded.
In considering the effects of private financing on a health
insurance system, a particularly important question is whether
as countries increase private financing to their health care sys-
tem there are corresponding decreases in the amount of public
money spent on health care. In the economics literature this is
referred to as "crowding-out," taken from the idea that, in this
case, private money crowds out public money instead of simply
adding to the total funds available for health care.
184 Steven Globerman & Aidan Vining, A Policy Perspective on "Mixed"
Health Care Financial Systems of Business and Economics, 65 J. RISK & INS. 57,
71 tbl.4 & 75 (1998).
185 Tuohy, Flood & Stabile, supra note 1, at 2-7.
186 CANADIAN INST. FOR HEALTH INFO, supra note 4.
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To attempt to answer this question, we previously exam-
ined changes in private health spending within each of twenty-
four OECD countries over a period of seventeen years and the
corresponding changes in the share of the total public budget
that was spent on health care over this same period. 187 While the
evidence does not definitively show that increases in private
financing caused a decline in public financing, the results do
show that over a seventeen year span, increases in the private
share of health care spending are consistently associated with a
decline in public spending on health as a share of total public
spending. The decline isn't a dollar for dollar decline, but the
numbers suggest that for every $10 of private money put in the
health care system, there is a decline, on average, of between $1
and $3 of public funding devoted to health care. A more de-
tailed examination of hospital and pharmaceutical spending in
particular revealed that while there is no correlation between
increases in private spending and declines in public spending in
the hospital sector, there is evidence of such correlations within
the pharmaceutical sector. This finding, which is consistent with
"crowding-out" of public money by private money in the phar-
maceutical sector is not surprising. Most public drug insurance
programs involve private co-payments, and most increased the
level of co-payment in the 1990s. In this sense the substitution
of private for public finance was a matter of deliberate policy
design.
What lessons can be taken from this? Private spending on
health care is likely to replace, at least in part, some of our pub-
lic spending. Therefore every private dollar spent on health care
will not necessarily be a new dollar going into our health care
system. The evidence suggests that some of these dollars will be
replacing the public money we currently spend on health.
D. Waiting Times
Whether private financing can help alleviate waiting times
for care is of particular policy importance to a number of pub-
licly funded countries. As patient expectations for timely and
technologically advanced care increase, countries which have
traditionally rationed care and technology through waiting times
are facing increasing pressure to use private funds as a means of
improving access. It is very difficult to ascertain from the avail-
187 Tuohy, Flood & Stabile, supra note 1, at 2-7.
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able data the extent to which waiting times are truly a problem
in Canada or in any other jurisdiction. Most governments are
reluctant to collect data on waiting lists because more often than
not this information is often used to criticize government per-
formance. Our data on percentage of the population waiting and
levels of private insurance is shown below in Table 2. What
data is available for Canada suggests that the percent of the
population on waiting lists in Canada increased very slightly, by
0.08 percentage points, between 1997 and 1999.188 In the Neth-
erlands, private insurance plays an important role in financing
the system but having private insurance does not allow an indi-
vidual to jump queues in the social insurance system. It is seen
as against a physician's ethical code to prefer a patient with pri-
vate insurance to a patient without and both kinds of patients
are treated side-by-side in the same hospitals.189 In the Nether-
lands the percent of the population on waiting lists is lower than
in Canada, at approximately half a percent in both 1997 and
1999.190 In New Zealand, where there is a two-tier system, there
appears to have been a rapid decline in the numbers waiting,
from a peak of 2.48% of the total population on waiting ists in
1997 down to 1.65% in 1999.191 However, this apparent decline
is misrepresentative of the true state of affairs. In response to
criticisms of long and growing waiting lists in the public sector,
the New Zealand government in 1997 introduced a "booking
system." In the new booking system patients are not "booked"
in for surgery unless the system can provide the service within
six months. Patients whose needs cannot be meet within this
time frame are referred back to their doctor to "manage" their
condition. So, what we have is now unofficial wait lists for wait
lists! In the United Kingdom, the percent of the population on
waiting lists was approximately 2.56% in 1997 and declined
only slightly to 2.26% in 1999.192
188 Infra tbl.2.
189 See Brouwer & Schut, supra note 59, at 65 (stating that "in the Nether-
lands uniform treatment of all (regardless of socio-economic status) is a broadly ac-
cepted principle of equity in health care"); see also Brouwer & Hermans, supra note
59, at 7-9 (concluding that special clinics for employees should be allowed because
they while they benefit the employees, they also benefit the positions of non-
employees).
'90 Infra tbl.2.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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In sum, there is no existing evidence supporting the idea
that private financing can reduce public waiting lists. Each of
the systems that allow for such a sector have waiting lists that
are similar to or longer than those in Canada, and indeed New
Zealand and the United Kingdom are significantly worse on
these measures. When waiting times have declined in the United
Kingdom, it has been in response to infusions of public funding,
such as the "Waiting List Initiative" of the late 1980s and early
1990s, and mechanisms to change incentives within the public
sector. Not only do parallel private systems not reduce waiting
lists in the public system, they may in one respect increase
them. Evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that parallel
private systems may attract healthier patients and perform rela-
tively less complicated procedures, thereby increasing the aver-
age complexity and dependency of patients continuing to use
the public system. Martin and Smith, for example, found evi-
dence that the length of stay in NHS hospitals was longer in ar-
eas with high levels of private inpatient facilities, which may
suggest that the private facilities "cream off' the less compli-
cated cases, leaving the local NHS facility with a relatively
complex case mix. 193
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we outlined the mix of public/private funding
in six OECD countries: Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. With
the exception of the United States and the Netherlands, each
country relies predominantly on government funding to pay for
their respective goals of ensuring access to a range of health
care on the basis of need and not ability to pay. Although the
Netherlands does not rely on government funding, it is repre-
sentative of the approach taken in a number of European coun-
tries. In these countries, health care systems are not financed
primarily from general taxation revenues but nonetheless are
progressively financed through mandatory social insurance con-
tributions on the part of employers and employees. In each
country the lines between what is "public" and what is "private"
193 See Stephen Martin & Peter Smith, Explaining Variations in Inpatient
Length of Stay in the National Health Service, 15 J. Health Econ. 279, 293-295
(1996) (finding that the factors that contribute the most to the length of stay are ac-
cess to NHS hospitals and private hospitals, elective surgery wait times, poverty indi-
cators, and availability of informal care indicators).
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are becoming increasingly blurred. For example, in Australia,
there is significant direct and indirect public subsidies and sup-
port for private insurers. This calls into question the utility of
the terms "public" and "private" and it may be more useful now
to speak of "regressive" and "progressive" financing, the latter
often being associated with publicly funded systems.
Where each country draws the boundaries between care that
is progressively financed and care that is distributed through
normal market mechanisms (on ability to pay) makes a great
deal of difference to the structure and dynamics of the system in
question. When we look closely at each country's mix of pub-
lic/private spending we see considerable variation depending on
the nature of the health care good or service in question. Al-
though every country except the United States adopts the guid-
ing philosophy that health care should be allocated on the basis
of need rather than ability to pay there are significant limita-
tions on the extent to which this principle is applied and varia-
tions across countries with regard to these limitations. For ex-
ample, in Canada hospital and physician services are fully pub-
licly funded but there is significantly more private financing,
where care is allocated on the basis of ability to pay, for drugs,
home care and long-term care. In New Zealand, there has long
been a system of private financing for family doctor care,
thereby rationing access into the rest of the public health care
system on the capacity to pay the out-of-pocket payments for
family doctor care. In Australia, there is a complicated system
of out-of-pocket payments but with a variety of safety nets in
place to ensure that those on low-incomes or the chronically ill
are not discouraged from accessing the care they need. By com-
parison, the United Kingdom tends to offer first-dollar coverage
for a broad range of health care services as does the Nether-
lands, extending indeed to long-term care, for, despite its appar-
ent reliance upon private insurance, it regulates to ensure the
goal of "solidarity."
In the absence of rationing by price or ability to pay-
through out-of-pocket payments-rationing can occur implicitly
through limitations on the capacity of the system (the number of
beds, providers, technology etc) or explicitly (through limita-
tions on the kinds of services publicly funded). In all of the
countries there has historically been little attempt to develop a
principled basis for determining the boundaries of the publicly
funded system, and most of the systems under study have relied
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on negotiations between government and physician bargaining
associations to determine what services will be publicly funded.
In New Zealand, the Netherlands, and in Oregon in the United
States 194 there has been a movement towards more explicit ra-
tioning and attempts have been made centrally to develop proc-
esses for deciding what services should be publicly funded. This
has proved to be a difficult process in practice. Instead most
systems have moved towards processes designed to determine
what priorities should be given in terms of public spending
rather than trying to determine a list of services to be publicly
funded. The lesson from these experiences seems to be that
while attempting to define a fixed list of services to be publicly
funded is likely to flounder there is fruit to be had in determin-
ing processes to establish priorities in health care spending.
Countries should consider how to articulate a principled process
for determining what is to be publicly funded. Recent court
challenges suggest that while courts will often be respectful of
public authorities taking decisions in the context of constrained
public resources, they will not simply accept an argument of
constrained resources and will wish to be assured that the public
authorities have a principled basis for resource allocation.
In all countries, public and, increasingly, private insurers
(through managed care) engage in some form of implicit ration-
ing to a greater or lesser degree. Indeed most of the real alloca-
tion decisions happen beyond that macro determination of what
broad range of health care goods and services to cover and oc-
cur as physicians decide who should receive care, in what se-
quence, and how quickly. But clearly there are problems with
relying on implicit rationing particularly where physicians as
gatekeepers to the system have no incentive to be sensitive to
the cost and benefits of the various services and goods they rec-
ommend or prescribe to their patients.' 95 Fiscal constraints in
the 1980s resulted in significant slowing in public spending
growth in Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia
and the Netherlands and capacity constraints and growing wait-
ing lists resulted in mounting public dissatisfaction and concern.
A public system is able to achieve what is impossible in a pure
194 Which is in the context of the Medicaid program for the poor.
195 The response to this in a number of countries has been to devolve budgets
to groups of physicians and other primary care providers, a topic beyond the reach of
this particular paper.
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market system, of ensuring access to care for those who need it
as opposed to those who can pay for it. But all public systems
seem to struggle with ensuring accountability for decision-
making at all levels and being responsive and flexible.
Citizens in the European Union are bringing claims that
they should be able to receive public funding from their home
country for services they obtain-in other Member States when
there are long waiting lists for treatment in their home country.
So far it seems the success of such a claim is related to provi-
sion in domestic legislation providing for timely treatment. In
response to concerns about long waiting times and concerns
about quality in the public sector some jurisdictions have en-
acted or proposed Patients' Bills or Charters of Rights. These
normally, however, are codifications of patients' common law
rights to give an informed consent and to confidentiality but
with an independent enforcement mechanism. As such they may
be very useful to improve the accountability of health care pro-
fessionals, but most peoples' concerns are not with the deci-
sions of their professionals but with those who manage, or fail
to appropriately manage, and fund the system. In the United
Kingdom some of the patients' rights speak to rights vis-h-vis
the managers of the system in terms of waiting times. Also in
systems with either more private insurance-the United States
and Australia-or private management-the social insurance
funds in the Netherlands-there are mechanisms to ensure ac-
countability on the part of these decisionmakers. As policymak-
ers consider how to ensure citizen satisfaction and enhance the
accountability of publicly funded systems, the experiences of
those countries that have tried to improve the accountability of
decisionmakers that manage resource allocation and waiting
times should be closely studied.
Turning now to sum up the evidence on the impact of the
public/private mix on health outcomes, utilization, spending,
and waiting times, the evidence generally points away from in-
creased private financing as a means to achieve effective health
care reform. There appears to be no relationship between in-
creased private spending and improved health outcomes. In fact,
we found a positive correlation between private health care
spending as a percent of total health spending and potential
years of life lost. This result has to be read with some caution as
it is only a simple correlation at a point in time. However, one
could hypothesize that this result reflects, in part, that private
20021
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spending tends to be skewed towards the more well off indi-
viduals where the returns to spending on health are smaller and
away from potentially more needy populations where the re-
turns are larger. Country specific evidence on the effects of pri-
vate, out of pocket cost sharing on access to care and health
outcomes shows that co-payments do indeed create barriers to
access and that these barriers can result in worse health out-
comes for the poor. The evidence on the relationship between
private financing and health care spending suggests that coun-
tries with higher levels of private financing such as the United
States have higher costs and higher cost growth than countries
with predominantly public payers such as Canada. Furthermore,
examining the impact of private financing on public health
funding suggests that increases in private financing are associ-
ated with declines, over time, in public funds allocated to health
care. Finally, the available evidence does not suggest that pri-
vate financing is successful in improving waiting times for care.
In fact, even in those countries, such as the United Kingdom,
with a second private health care tier, public initiatives to im-
prove waiting times in the primary tier have proven more suc-
cessful.
Frustrations with the limitations of publicly funded health
care systems often result in calls for increased private financing
as a cure to what bedevils the public system. We conclude that
there is no magic solution in private financing for publicly
funded system. In order to achieve the goals of a publicly
funded health care sector-to allocate care on the basis of need
and not ability to pay-requires that the funding of the system
remain concentrated within the realm of the public and quasi-
public (social insurance systems). This does not preclude initia-
tives with the private sector with regard to the delivery of health
care services. At the heart of concerns about public health care
systems are concerns about the decisions of the funders and
managers of these systems but these decisionmakers are not
normally the targets of health reform initiatives, although inter-
estingly there are likely to be more explicit initiatives to ensure
accountability in private systems. In order then to improve pub-
licly funded systems, reforms must look at how to improve the
decision-making capacity of funders and managers. Clearly an
important step in legitimizing the inevitable allocation decisions
that must be made is to develop fairer and better processes for
determining the borders of solidarity in health care. Within pub-
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licly funded systems we must also look to instill accountability
for decision-making at all levels and put in place incentives for
responsiveness and flexibility.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: OECD Statistics on Public/Private Expenditure by
Source, 1997
Country Total exp Public exp % Private exp % Public on
% GDP total exp. on total exp. on health %
health health total pub.
exp.
Australia 8.4 66.7 33.3 16.0
Canada 9.2 69.8 30.2 15.2
Netherlands 8.5 72.6 27.4 12.7
New Zealand 7.6 77.3 22.7 12.8
United 6.8 84.5 15.5 14.6
Kingdom
United States 13.9 46.4 53.6 20.3
Table lb: OECD Statistics on Health Expenditure by Source as
a Percent of Total Health Expenditure, 1997
Country Govt. Social Private Out of pocket
spending, security insurance payments
not social
security
Australia 63.8 -- 9.4 16.2
Canada 68.5 0.8 10.9 17.1
Netherlands 4.3 65.4 18.0 6.6
New Zealand 77.3 -- 6.8 22.7
United 3.5
Kingdom 73.9 9.7 11
United States 31.1 14.3 32.4 17.7
100% as there* Note: In some countries rows may not equal
are other potential sources of funding.
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Table 2: Private Health Insurance and Public Sector Waiting
Lists and Waiting Times, Selected Nations, Late 1990s 196
Country % of Pop. on % of Pop. with % Reporting waits of
waiting lists supp. private hosp. more than 4 months
insurance.* for elective surgery
1999 1997 Most recent statis- 1998
tics
Canada 0.7% 0.62% 0% 10%
New Zealand 1.65% 2.48% 37% (1996/1997) 21%
United 2.26% 2.56% 11.5% (1998) 29%
Kingdom
Netherlands 0.50% 0.51% 0% NA
Australia N/A 0.8% 31.2% (1999) 13%
Table 3: One-year correlations between health outcomes and
spending on health across OECD countries.
Health Measure / Male Female Incidence Infant Potential
Spending Meas- Life Life of Cancer Mort. yrs. of life
ure Expect. Expect. lost (all
causes)
Health spending 0.3405 0.4433* 0.4420* -0.4700* 0.4251
as a % of GDP (0.1034) (0.0300) (0.0306) (0.0236) (0.0889)
196 Tuohy, Flood & Stabile, supra note 1.
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Public expendi- 0.2771 0.0571 0.0721 0.0355 0.2599
ture on Health as (0.2240) (0.8057) (0.7563) (0.8818) (0.3310)
a % of Total
Public Expendi-
ture
Public expendi- 0.5816 0.6193* 0.6223* -0.6815* -0.3178
ture on health as (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0003) (0.2139)
a % of GDP
Private health -0.1593 -0.0717 -0.1129 0.1689 0.6671*
spending as a % (0.4572) (0.7392) (0.5994) (0.4410) (0.0034)
of total health
spending
1. P-Values in parentheses.
2. OECD data, 1997 for life expectancy, 1996 for cancer and
infant mortality, 1995 for preventable deaths.
* denotes significance at the 5% level.
[Vol. 12:297
